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This paper presents series on top shares of income and wealth in Spain over 
the 20
th century using personal income and wealth tax return statistics. Top 
income  shares  are  highest  in  the  1930s,  fall  sharply  during  the  first  two 
decades  of  the  Franco  dictatorship,  and  have  increased  slightly  since  the 
1960s, and especially since the mid-1990s. The top 0.01% income share in 
Spain  estimated  from  income  tax  data  is  comparable  to  estimates  for  the 
United States and France over the period 1933-1971. Those findings, along 
with a careful analysis of all published tax statistics, suggest that income tax 
evasion and avoidance among top income earners in Spain before 1980 was 
much less prevalent than previously thought. Wealth concentration has been 
about stable from 1982 to 2004 as surging real estate prices have benefited 
the middle class and compensated for a slight increase in financial wealth 
concentration in the 1990s. We use our wealth series and a simple conceptual 
model to analyse the effects of the wealth tax exemption of stocks for owners-
managers introduced in 1994. We show that the reform induced substantial 
shifting from the taxable to tax exempt status. This shifting has eroded the 
wealth  tax  base  substantially  and  hence  the  tax  exemption  has  generated 
large efficiency costs. 
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The evolution of income and wealth inequality during the process of 
development has attracted enormous attention in the economics literature. A 
number  of  recent  studies  have  constructed  series  for  shares  of  income 
accruing  to  upper  income  groups  for  various  countries  using  income  tax 
statistics. Most of those studies are gathered in a volume edited by Atkinson 
and Piketty, 2007. The countries studied are Anglo-Saxon countries (United 
Kingdom, Ireland, United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia) and 
continental  European  countries  (Finland,  France,  Germany,  Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland) and large Asian countries (China, India, Indonesia, 
and Japan). No such study has analyzed Southern European countries. This 
paper proposes to start filling this gap by analyzing the Spanish experience. 
Spain is an interesting country to analyze on several grounds. 
First, there are very few studies on the evolution of inequality in Spain 
from a historical perspective. A number of studies have analyzed the evolution 
of income, earnings and expenditure inequality over the last three decades 
using survey data. Research has also been done using income tax data for 
recent  years.
1  Survey-based  studies  point  to  a  reduction  in  income  or 
expenditure inequality in the 1970s followed by relative stability in the 1980s 
and 1990s, while tax-based results display a worsening in the distribution of 
income  in  1982-1991  and  1995-1998.  Garde,  Ruiz-Huerta,  and  Martínez, 
1995, provide a survey of the literature until 1995.
2 More recently, Prados de 
la Escosura, 2006a, 2007b has constructed long historical series on income 
inequality  such  as ratios  of  GDP  per  capita  to  low  skill  wages  or  average 
wages, as well as industry wage differentials. Those estimates are not based 
                                                 
1 Those studies, which include Castañer, 1991, Lasheras et al., 1993, Ayala and Onrubia, 
2001,  and  Rodríguez  and  Salas,  2006,  focus  primarily  on  the  redistributive  power  of  the 
income tax. They estimate global inequality indices such as Gini before and after taxes and 
do not specifically focus on top income groups as we do here.  
2 For key studies on income inequality in Spain over the last decades, see Alcaide, 1967, 
1974, 1999, Alcaide and Alcaide, 1974, 1977, 1983, Alvarez et al., 1996, Ayala and Onrubia, 
2001,  Ayala  and  Sastre,  2005,  Ayala  et  al.,  1993,  Bosch  et  al.,  1989,  Budría  and  Díaz-
Giménez, 2007, Cordero et al., 1988, Del Río and Ruiz-Castillo, 2001a,b, Escribano, 1990, 
Febrer and Mora, 2005, Goerlich and Mas, 2001, 2004, Gradín, 2000, 2002, Martín-Guzmán 








































1  2 
on micro-data but offer the best evidence to date on inequality trends in Spain 
from a historical perspective. Therefore, our study can be seen as the first 
serious  attempt  at  compiling  systematic  and  long  run  series  of  income 
concentration using primarily individual tax statistics, a source that has not 
been fully exploited by previous studies. It is also important to note that our 
series  measure  only  top  income  (or  wealth)  concentration  and  hence  are 
silent about changes in the lower and middle part of the distribution. As a 
result,  our  series  can  very  well  follow  different  patterns  than  broader 
measures of inequality such as Gini coefficients or macro-based estimates, an 
important point we will emphasize throughout. 
Second,  up  to  the  1950s,  Spain  was  still  largely  an  agricultural 
economy with a GDP per capita around $4,000 (in today dollars) similar to 
developing countries such as Pakistan or Egypt today.
3 Indeed, because of 
the civil war shock and the poor economic performance during the first two 
decades of the Franco dictatorship, Spain GDP per capita did not reach the 
peak  of  1929  before  1951.  Starting  in  the  1950s  and  following  economic 
liberalization  and  openness  to  trade,  economic  growth  resumed  at  a  very 
quick pace. Today, Spain’s GDP per capita is only about 20% lower than GDP 
per  capita  of  the  largest  western  European  economies  such  as  France, 
Germany, or the United Kingdom. Therefore, it is quite interesting to analyze 
income concentration during the stagnation years and during the economic 
boom  starting  in  the  late  1950s  to  re-assess  the  link  between  economic 
development and income concentration.  
Third,  Spain  has  undergone  dramatic  political  changes  since  the 
1930s. Spain was a republic from 1931 to 1939. A progressive government 
first  ran  the  republic  from  1931  to  1933,  followed  by  a  conservative 
government from 1933 to 1935, when some reforms of the previous years 
were abandoned. The reformist parties returned to power in 1935; however, 
the  division  between  the  advocates  of  the  democratic  changes  and  those 
                                                                                                                                          
1998, Ruiz-Castillo and Sastre, 1999. A summary of the key findings can be found in the 
appendix. 
3 Prados de la Escosura, 2003, 2006b, 2007a has constructed historical GDP and growth 
series  for  Spain.  He  emphasizes  that,  before  the  economic  stagnation  of  the  1930-1952 
period, Spain experienced significant economic growth since 1850, in particular from 1850-
1883 and in the 1920s. Maddison, 2001, 2003 also reproduces those historical series of real 








































1  3 
supporting a revolutionary process became evident soon. A military coup lead 
by General Franco, followed by a three year long civil war, transformed Spain 
into  a  dictatorship  from  1939  till  the  death of  Franco  in  1975.  Since  then, 
Spain  has  returned  to  democracy  and  was  run  from  1982  to  1996  by  the 
Socialist  party,  which  tried  to  implement  progressive  policies  such  as  the 
development  of  progressive  income  and  wealth  taxation,  and  of  a  welfare 
state  with  universal  health  coverage.  The  study  of  top  income  and  wealth 
shares  in  Spain  can  cast  light  on  the  effects  of  the  political  regime  and 
economic policies on inequality and concentration. 
Finally,  over  the  last  twenty  years,  Spain  has  implemented  large 
income and wealth tax reforms among which sharp reductions in top income 
marginal tax rates. Spain has also modified the wealth tax base by exempting 
corporate  stocks  and  business  assets  for  corporate  and  business  owners 
actively  involved  in  managing  the  business  in  1994.  Our  constructed  top 
income and wealth shares can be used to cast light on the effects of taxation 
on  the  economic  and  tax  avoiding  behavior  of  the  affluent.  We  propose  a 
detailed application in the case of the 1994 wealth tax exemption.   
Our results show that income concentration was much higher during 
the  1930s  than  it  is  today.  The  top  0.01%  income  share  estimated  from 
reported incomes was about twice higher in the 1930s than over the last two 
decades.  The  top  0.01%  income  share  fell  sharply  during  the  first  two 
decades  of  the  Franco  dictatorship,  and  has  increased  slightly  since  the 
1970s, and especially since the mid-1990s. Interestingly, both the level and 
the  time pattern  of the  top  0.01%  income  share  in  Spain  is  fairly  close  to 
comparable  estimates  for  the  United  States  (Piketty  and  Saez,  2003)  and 
France (Piketty, 2001, 2003) over the period 1933-1971, especially the post-
World  War  II  decades.  Those  findings, along  with  a  careful  analysis  of  all 
published tax statistics as well as a re-evaluation of previous academic work 
on income tax evasion in Spain, leads us to conclude that income tax evasion 
and avoidance in Spain before 1980 was much less prevalent than previously 
thought at the top of the distribution. As a result, those income tax statistics 
are a valuable primary data source for analysing income concentration. 
Over  the  last  two  decades,  top  income  shares  have  increased 








































1  4 
gains. The gains, however, have been concentrated in the top percentile (and 
especially  the  top  fractiles  within  the  top  percentile)  with  little  changes  in 
income shares of upper income groups below the top percentile. Financial 
wealth concentration has also increased in the 1990s due to a surge in stock 
prices, which are held disproportionately by the wealthy. However, real estate 
prices  have  increased  sharply  as  well.  As  real  estate  wealth  is  less 
concentrated than financial wealth, on net, top wealth shares (including both 
financial and real estate wealth) have declined slightly during the period 1982-
2002.  
The  data  show  that  the  wealth  tax  exemption  of  stocks  for  owner-
managers since 1994 has gradually and substantially eroded the wealth tax 
base, especially at the very top: by 2002, the top 0.01% wealth holders could 
exempt about 40% of their wealth because of this exemption. We develop a 
simple  conceptual  model  to  explain  this  phenomenon,  which  we  estimate 
using our wealth series. Our empirical results show evidence of very strong 
shifting effects whereby wealthy business owners were able to re-organize 
their  business  ownership  and  activities  in  order  to  take  advantage  of  the 
reform. This suggests that this tax exemption both reduced the redistributive 
power  of  the  progressive  wealth  tax  and  created  substantial  deadweight 
burden  as  business  owners  were  taking  costly  steps  to  qualify  for  the 
exemption. The case study of the wealth tax exemption illustrates how our 
series can be used to cast light on the evaluation of tax policy reforms. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  our  data 
sources, outlines our estimation methods, and discusses the issue of income 
tax evasion in Spain. In Section 3, we present and analyze the trends in top 
income shares since 1933 as well as the composition of top incomes since 
1981. Section 4 focuses on top wealth shares and composition since 1982. 
Section 5 uses the wealth series to analyze the efficiency costs of the wealth 
tax  exemption  of  1994.  Finally,  Section  6  offers  a  brief  conclusion.  The 
complete details on our data and methods, as well as the complete sets of 
results are presented in appendix.
4  
 
                                                 








































1  5 
2. Data, Methodological Issues, and Context 
 
2.1. Data and Series Construction 
 
Our estimates are from personal income and wealth tax return statistics 
compiled by the Spanish fiscal administration for a number of years from 1933 
to 1971 and annually from 1981 on. The statistical data presented are much 
more detailed for the 1981-2004 period than for the older period. Because the 
received  wisdom  is  that  the  individual  income  tax  was  poorly  enforced, 
especially in the pre-1981 period, we will discuss in great detail this issue in 
Section  2.2  and  throughout  the text  in  Section  3.  Complete details  on  the 
methodology are provided in appendix. 
Before 1981, because of very high exemption levels, only a very small 
fraction  of  individuals  had  to  file  individual  tax  returns  and  therefore,  by 
necessity,  we  must  restrict  our  analysis  to  the  top  0.1%  of  the  income 
distribution (and for 1933-1949 even the top 0.01%). From 1981 on, we can 
analyze the top 10% of the income distribution. Spain has adopted an annual 
personal wealth tax since 1978. Detailed statistics on the ‘new’ income and 
wealth tax have started to be published in 1981 and 1982 respectively.
5 The 
progressive wealth tax has high exemption levels and only the top 2% or 3% 
wealthiest individuals file wealth tax returns. Thus, we limit our analysis of 
wealth concentration to the top 1% and above, and for the period 1982 to 
2004. For 1981 to the present, estimates are based on Spain excluding two 
autonomous  regions:  Pais  Vasco  and  Navarra,  because  they  manage  the 
income  tax  directly  and  hence  are  excluded  from  the  statistics.  Those two 
regions  represent  about  10%  of  Spain  in  terms  of  population  and  income. 
From 1933 to 1935, estimates are based on all Spain; Navarra is excluded 
since 1937 and Alava (one of the three provinces from the Pais Vasco) since 
1943.  
Our top groups are defined relative to the total number of adults (aged 
20  and  above)  from  the  Spanish  census  (not  the  number  of  tax  returns 
                                                 
5 The official publication exists since 1979 for the income tax and since 1981 for the wealth 
tax. However, the statistical quality of the data for the first years is defective with obvious and 








































1  6 
actually filed). For example, in 2004, there are 30,718,000 adults in Spain 
(excluding Pais Vasco and Navarra) and hence the top 1% represents the top 
307,180 tax filers, etc. The Spanish income tax is individually based since 
1988 (although joint filing remains possible, it is always advantageous to file 
separately  when  both  spouses  have  incomes).  Before  1988,  the  Spanish 
income tax was family based. We correct our estimates for 1981-1987 using 
the  micro-data  (which  allow  to  compute  both  family  and  individual  income 
after the reform) in order to account for this change in law.
6 
 We define income as gross income before all deductions and including 
all income items reported on personal tax returns: salaries and pensions, self-
employment  and  unincorporated  business  net  income,  dividends,  interest, 
other  investment  income  and  other  smaller  income  items.  Realized  capital 
gains are also included in the tax base since 1979 (but were excluded from 
the base in the earlier period). In order to create comparable series before 
and after 1979, we also estimate series excluding capital gains for the period 
1981-2004.  Our  income  definition  is  before  personal  income  taxes  and 
personal  payroll  taxes  but  after  employers’  payroll  taxes  and  corporate 
income taxes. 
The wealth tax is a progressive tax on the sum of all individual wealth 
components net of debts with a significant top rate of 2.5% in the top bracket 
for  very  large  wealth  holdings.
7  In  general, real  estate  wealth  is  not  taxed 
according to its market value but according to its registry value (“catastro”) for 
property tax purposes. Market prices are about 2 to 3 times as high as registry 
value on average. Real estate wealth is a very large component of wealth in 
Spain. Therefore, we use two definitions of wealth, one including real estate 
wealth evaluated at market prices and one excluding real estate wealth (and 
excluding  also  mortgage  debt  on  the passive  side)  which  we  call  financial 
wealth. Total wealth is clearly a better measure of wealth but is not directly 
measured  in  the  wealth  tax  statistics  and  hence  requires  making  large 
                                                 
6 The old income tax was based on individual income from 1933 to 1939 and based on family 
income from 1940 on. We do not correct estimates for the 1940-1971 period because, at the 
very top of the distribution, we expect spouses’ incomes to be small during that period where 
very few married women worked. 








































1  7 
adjustments. Financial wealth is a more narrow definition of wealth but it is 
better measured in tax statistics.  
Our main data consist of tables displaying the number of tax returns, 
the  amounts  reported,  and  the  income  or  wealth  composition  for  a  large 
number of income brackets. As the top tail of the income distribution is very 
well  approximated  by  Pareto  distributions,  we  can  use  simple  parametric 
interpolation methods to estimate the thresholds and average income levels 
for each fractile. This method follows the classical study by Kuznets, 1953 and 
has been used as well as in all the top income studies presented in Atkinson 
and  Piketty,  2007.  In  the  case  of  Spain,  a  very  large  cross-section  of 
individual  micro  tax  data  over  sampling  high  incomes  is  available  for  year 
2002. A 2 percent panel of tax returns is also available from 1982 to 1998. 
Therefore,  we  use  the  micro  data  to  check  the  validity  of  our  estimations 
based  on  published  tax  statistics.  We  find  that  our  tabulations  based 
estimates are almost always very close (within 2-5 percent) to the micro-data 
based estimates, giving us confidence that the errors due to interpolation are 
fairly modest.
8 
In order to estimate shares of income, we need to divide the income 
amounts  accruing  to  each  fractile  by  an estimate  of  total  personal  income 
defined ideally as total personal income reported on income tax returns had 
everybody  been  required  to  file  a  tax  return.  Because  only  a  fraction  of 
individuals file a tax return (especially in the pre-1979 era), this total income 
denominator cannot be estimated using income tax statistics and needs to be 
estimated using National Accounts
9 and the GDP series created by Prados de 
la Escosura, 2003 for the pre-1979 period. For the recent period 1981-2004, 
we approximate the ideal income denominator as the sum of (1) total wages 
and salaries (net of social security contributions) from National Accounts, (2) 
50%  of  Social  Transfers  from  National  Accounts  (as  pensions,  which 
represent about half of such transfers, are taxed under the income tax), (3) 
66.6%  of  unincorporated  business  income  from  National  Accounts  (as  we 
                                                 
8 We also use the micro-data to produce estimates on top wage income shares as the micro-








































1  8 
estimate that about 1/3 of such business income is from the informal sector 
and hence escapes taxation), (4) all capital income reported on tax returns (as 
capital income is very concentrated, non-filers receive a negligible fraction of 
capital income
10). Our denominator for the 1981-2004 period is around 66% of 
Spanish  GDP  (excluding  Pais  Vasco  and  Navarra)  with  small  fluctuations 
across years, which is comparable to other studies in Atkinson and Piketty 
2007.  For  the  pre-1979  period,  because  there  are  no  detailed  personal 
income series in the National Accounts series constructed by Prados de la 
Escosura, we define our denominator as 66% of GDP.
11 We proceed similarly 
to  compute  wealth  shares.  In  that  case,  we  use  estimates  of  aggregate 
financial net wealth and real estate wealth from the Bank of Spain. 
Table  1  gives  thresholds  and  average  incomes  for  a  selection  of 
fractiles  for  Spain  in  2004.  As  just  mentioned,  the  average  income  is 
estimated primarily from National Accounts and hence is largely independent 
of  our  tax  statistics
12  and  hence  not  biased  downwards  because  of  tax 
evasion or avoidance. 
After  analyzing  the  top  share  data,  we  turn  to  the  composition  of 
income  and  wealth.  Using  published  information  and  a  simple  linear 
interpolation method, we decompose the amount of income for each fractile 
into employment income, entrepreneurial income (self-employment and small 
business  income),  capital  income,  and  capital  gains  (we  also  check  the 
accuracy of our estimation using the micro-tax data for the years when the 
micro-data is available). We divide wealth into real estate (net of mortgage 
                                                                                                                                          
9 Using tax returns to compute the level of top incomes and national accounts to compute the 
total  income  denominator  dates  from  the  famous  Kuznets’  study  (1953)  on  American 
inequality. This method is also used is most of the studies compiled in Atkinson and Piketty, 
2007.  
10 For example, in 2002, the top 10% income earners (representing about one fifth of all tax 
filers as only about half of adults file taxes) obtained 65% of total capital income reported on 
tax returns. Capital income in personal income in National Accounts is substantially different 
from capital income on tax returns because of imputed rents of homeowners, imputed interest 
to bank account holders, returns on (non-taxable) pension funds, etc. That is why we use 
capital  income  from  tax  returns  to  define  our  denominator.  See  e.g.  Park  2000,  for  a 
comprehensive comparison in the case of the United States where over 90% of adults file tax 
returns. 
11 We take into account the exclusion of Navarra since 1937 and that of Alava since 1943. 
12 It is important to note that average incomes are low because they include a large number of 
non  working  adults  (such  as  non  working  wives  or  students)  with  either  no  or  very  small 








































1  9 
debt), fixed claim assets, corporate stocks, and other components (net of non 
mortgage debts). 
 
2.2 The issue of Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
 
Income  tax  data  have  hardly  been  used  before  to  study  income 
concentration, especially prior to 1979, because there is a widely held view 
that income tax evasion in Spain was very high, and that consequently, the 
income tax data vastly under-estimate actual incomes.
13 A careful analysis of 
the income tax statistics shows that evasion and avoidance in Spain at the 
very top of the distribution during the first decades of existence of the tax was 
most likely not significantly higher than it was in other countries such as the 
United States or France. It is therefore critical to understand the roots of this 
widely held view, which is based on two main arguments. 
First, very few individuals were paying income tax and the individual 
income  tax  was  raising  a  very  small  amount  of  revenue  relative  to  GDP. 
Second, the administration did not have the means to enforce the income tax, 
especially when the exemption thresholds were significantly reduced in the 
1960s, and when tax filers could very easily exaggerate their deductions to 
avoid the tax.  
The first argument is factually true as only about 1,500 individuals paid 
taxes  in  1933  (about  0.01%  of  all  adults),  and  throughout  the  1950s  and 
1960s the number of taxpayers rarely exceeded 40,000 (about 0.2% of all 
adults).  Combined  with  relatively  low  tax  rates  (except  at  the  very  top 
brackets), it is therefore not surprising that the income tax was only raising 
between  0.03%  of  GDP  in  1933  and  0.22%  of  GDP  in  1978.
14  However, 
extremely high exemption levels can very well explain such facts even in the 
absence  of  tax  evasion.  Indeed,  in  1933,  the  filing  threshold  was  100,000 
                                                 
13 Comín, 1994 and Comín and Zafra Oteyza, 1994 provide a historical account on the issues 
of fiscal fraud and tax amnesties over the last century in Spain; Díaz Fuentes, 1994 focuses 
on the period 1940-1990. For the view that income tax evasion was very high in the pre-1979 
period, see Breña Cruz et al. 1974, Castillo Lopez, 1992, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1973, 
Martí Basterrechea, 1974..  
14 We report in appendix Table G the revenue (as a share of GDP) of each tax source in 









































1  10 
Pesetas,  that  is,  66  times  the  average  income  per  adult  (equal  to  around 
1,500  Pesetas  based  on  our  denominator  estimation  described  in  Section 
2.1).
15  Our  series  will  show  that  income  concentration  based on  those  tax 
statistics  was  very  high  in  the  1930s  (about  twice  as  high  as  in  recent 
decades), and actually not much lower than levels estimated for the United 
States or France. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the number of 
filers and income reported at the very top are unreasonably low. 
The  second  argument  that  enforcement  was  poor  also  needs  to  be 
qualified. It is undoubtedly true that the 1964-1967 income tax reform that 
eliminated the high exemption levels failed to transform the income tax into a 
mass  tax  as  the  fiscal  administration  kept  using  de  facto  high  exemption 
levels and did not try to make taxpayers with incomes below 200,000 or even 
300,000 Pesetas pay the tax (Martí Basterrechea, 1974).  
However, there are three main reasons to believe that enforcement for 
very top taxpayers remained acceptable under the old income tax for most of 
the period for which we have data. First, historically, early progressive income 
tax systems always use very high exemption levels and therefore only a very 
small fraction of the population at the top was liable for the tax. The rationale 
for using income taxes on the very rich only is precisely because, at the early 
stages  of  economic  development  with  substantial  economic  activity  taking 
place  in  small  businesses  with  no  verifiable  accounts,  it  is much easier  to 
enforce a tax on a small number of easily identifiable individuals. The rich are 
identifiable because they are well known in each locality and they derive their 
incomes from large and modern businesses with verifiable accounts, or from 
highly paid (and verifiable) salaried positions, or property income from publicly 
known  assets  (such  as  large  land  estates  with  regular  rental  income).
16 
Therefore, the small size of the Spanish income tax is due to the fact that it 
                                                 
15 For further comparisons, in 1933, the annual salary of a qualified officer to the government 
statistics bureau was 4,000 pesetas, while a high-ranking postal service employee received 
11,000 pesetas per year (Gaceta de Madrid, 12/31/1933). 
16 Seligman (1911) is the classical reference on the history of early income taxes. The studies 
gathered  in  Atkinson  and  Piketty,  2007  all  show  that  the  early  income  taxes  in  Western 
countries were limited  to a small number of  tax filers. All those studies show that income 
concentration measures derived from those early income tax statistics are always very high 
suggesting  that  enforcement  of  the  income  tax  on  the  rich  was  acceptable.  The  case  of 








































1  11 
was  a  tax  limited  to  the  very  rich  and  should  not  be  interpreted  as  the 
consequence of poor enforcement.
17 Indeed, official statistics show that the 
administration  was  able  to  audit  a  very  significant  fraction of  individual  tax 
returns in the pre-1960 period. The audit rates were on average around 10-
20% and hence significantly higher than today (see Table F2 and Table F3 in 
appendix).  It  is  likely  that  audit  rates  were  even  higher  for  the  top  2,000 
income earners in the top 0.01%.  
Second,  when  the  progressive  income  tax  was  started,  Spain  had 
already  set  in place  schedule  income  taxes  on  wages  and  salaries, rents, 
corporate profits, business profits, and capital income.
18 As a result, most of 
the income components of the rich were already being taxed through those 
schedule taxes, which offered an alternative way to verify the incomes of the 
rich.
19 Furthermore, like France, Spain also adopted and used presumptive 
income taxation based on external signs of wealth (such as ownership of cars, 
planes, or yachts, or employment of domestic workers) in cases where the 
administration suspected tax evasion or avoidance.
20  
Third,  the  administration  also  threatened  to  make  public  the  list  of 
taxpayers in order to shame prominent tax evaders (Albiñana, 1969a). Such 
                                                                                                                                          
less advanced than Spain in the 1930s could successfully enforce a tax on the rich (Moriguchi 
and Saez, 2007). The Spanish case seems to follow this general pattern as well. 
17 In the discussions leading to the creation of the income tax during 1932, it was recognized 
that  enforcement  would  be  acceptable  only  if  the  exemption  threshold  was  chosen  high 
enough. The parliamentary debates show that, although some congressmen considered that 
the exemption level was too high, it was recognized that the tax authority lacked both the 
managerial capabilities and the necessary human resources to administer a broader income 
tax  (Vallejo  Pousada,  1995).  Most  Western  countries  broadened  their  income  tax  during 
extraordinary events such as the World Wars, and this required a very large administrative 
effort. 
18 The time series of the revenue raised by each of those schedule taxes are compiled is 
reported in appendix Table G. 
19 Crosschecking of income tax returns with the schedule income tax returns did take place, 
as stated, for instance, in Albiñana et al., 1974 and Gota Losada, 1966. Starting in 1933, the 
administration prepared personal listings with information from all schedule taxes in order to 
identify individuals with very high incomes. Along the same lines, in 1940 the government 
launched the ‘Registro de Rentas y Patrimonios,’ (Registry of Income and Wealth) in which 
information from personal wealth was gathered with the aim of assisting income tax audits. 
Additionally, the high level of land ownership concentration allowed local tax authorities to 
identify  large  estate  proprietors  and  rents  for  rural  rent  tax  purposes  (see,  for  instance, 
Carrión, 1972, 1973, and Alvarez Rey, 2007). 
20 According to Albiñana et al., 1974, Castillo Lopez, 1992 and Martí Basterrechea, 1974, 
extraordinary deductions were among the main sources for tax evasion after the reform of 
1964-1967.  Tax  statistics  report  the  amount  of  extraordinary  deductions,  which  are  only 
around 5% of income in the late 1950s. Our series are estimated based on income before 
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lists were published for tax years 1933, 1934, and 1935 in the official state 
bulletin. Those lists show that virtually all the largest aristocratic real estate 
owners  among  the  ‘Grandes  de  España’  (the  highest  nobility  rank),  were 
taxpayers,  demonstrating  that  the  traditional  aristocracy  could  not  evade 
entirely the income tax.
21 
Contemporaneous observers (Albiñana 1969a,b, Gota Losada, 1970) 
suggest  that  enforcement  deteriorated  during  the  last  decade  of  Franco’s 
regime.
22 This view is based primarily on the fact that the 1964-1967 reform 
virtually eliminated exemptions and transformed the income tax in a mass tax, 
linked to schedule taxes. In practice however, the income tax remained a tax 
on very high incomes only as the mass tax was not enforced. Therefore, a 
much  more  accurate  statement  is  that  the  Spanish  income  tax  could  not 
become a mass tax (as this happened in most Western countries around the 
mid-20
th  century)  without  a  significant  administrative  effort  that  the  Franco 
regime never seriously attempted, hence giving the impression that the tax 
was primitive and poorly enforced relative to other countries.
23 However, this 
does not mean that the Spanish income tax was not properly enforced on very 
top incomes, and most of the hard evidence that we have been able to gather 
points  toward  enforcement  levels  and  techniques  for  the  very  top  of  the 
distribution, that were comparable to those used in other countries. 
                                                 
21  In  1932,  the  list  of  all  the  Grandes  de  España  (who  were  part  of  the  land  reform 
expropriation) was published in the Gaceta de Madrid (12/16/1932). Carrion, 1973, provides 
details of the land area owned by the largest estate proprietors among them. By comparing 
these  lists  and  the  income  tax  lists  it  turns  out  that  100%  of  owners  of  more  than  3,000 
hectares were income taxpayers (36 people). If proprietors of more than 1,000 hectares are 
considered (65 people), 92% are present in the tax lists. It should be pointed out that this 
does not imply that the missing 8% were necessarily evaders; in most cases their ascendants 
paid  the income tax, which reflects different timing between land  ownership transfers and 
nobility title transfers (due, for example, to male preference). Additionally, close inspection of 
the  income  tax  lists  shows  that  over  one  tenth  of  all  taxpayers  in  1933-1935  were  either 
Grandes or close relatives. 
22 The economic historian Francisco Comín reported to us a well-known story: during the final 
period of the dictatorship, the commission in charge of redesigning the income tax asked the 
fiscal authorities for the list of top taxpayers. Strikingly, the top of list consisted in famous 
bullfighters  and  show  business  stars  rather  than  bankers  or  large  business  owners. 
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any written reference on this and it is possible that 
the story has been widely exaggerated as it was told and re-told overtime. As just discussed, 
the published lists of taxpayers in 1933-1935 provide hard evidence that goes in the opposite 
direction. 
23 Fiscal inspectors were highly regarded from a social point of view, and their work should not 
be questioned. Many of them have extensively written on income tax issues, as Albiñana, 
1969a,b,  Albiñana  et  al.,  1974,  Breña  Cruz  et  al.,  1974,  Gota  Losada,  1966,  1970,  Martí 
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3. Top Income Shares and Composition  
 
3.1 Top Income Shares 
 
Figure  1  displays  the  average  personal  income  per  adult  estimated 
from National Accounts that is used as the denominator for our top income 
shares estimations along with the price index for the period 1932 to 2004. As 
discussed in the introduction and as shown in Prados de la Escosura, 2003, 
2006b, 2007a, real economic growth (per capita) was negative from 1930 to 
the early 1950s. Rapid economic growth started in the 1950s. Growth was 
fastest in the 1960s. Economic growth stalled during the transition period to 
democracy and the first years of the democracy from 1975 to 1985, and then 
resumed again.  
Figure 2 displays the top 0.01% income share from 1933 to 2004. The 
break from 1971 to 1981 denotes the change from the old income tax to the 
new income tax. Four important findings emerge from this figure. 
First, the highest income concentration occurs in the 1930s. The top 
0.01%  share  was  around  1.5%  and  about  twice  as  high  as  in  the  recent 
period. This finding is not surprising as Spain was a country with low average 
income  and  with  high  concentration  of  wealth  and,  in  particular,  land 
ownership.
24  However,  lack  of  any  statistics  on  income  or  wealth 
concentration made this claim impossible to establish rigorously. The use of 
the old income tax statistics demonstrates that Spanish income concentration 
was  indeed  much  higher  in  the  pre-civil  war  period  than  it  is  today.
25 
Interestingly, tax statistics providing the composition of reported top incomes 
show  that  taxpayers  in  1941  (representing  the  top  0.03%)  obtained  about 
20% of their income from returns on real estate (rents), 35% from returns on 
financial assets, 25% from non farm business income, 5% from farm business 
income, and about 15% from employment income (see Table H in appendix). 
                                                 
24 The land reform of the  Second Republic was not successful in redistributing large land 
estates and was eventually abandoned (see Malefakis, 1971 and Carrión, 1973). 
25 If tax evasion at the very top was higher in the 1930s than today, then this reinforces our 
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This suggests that, at the beginning of the Franco regime, only a minority of 
top income earners were passive landowners deriving all their income from 
rents  (the  traditional  image  of  the  agrarian  aristocracy  of  the  ‘Grandes  de 
España,’  mainly  concentrated  in  the  central  and  southern  areas  of  the 
country). Top income earners were much more likely to be also owners of 
financial assets and non-farm businesses. 
Second, the old income tax statistics display a large decrease in the 
top 0.01% income share from 1.4% 1941 to 0.6% in the early 1950s, during 
the first decade of the Franco dictatorship. We have argued in Section 2.2 that 
there  is  no  compelling  hard  evidence  suggesting  a  deterioration  of 
enforcement at the very top of the distribution and, therefore, we conclude 
that the poor economic management and the turn toward economic autarchy 
did  not  benefit  top  incomes  and  actually  reduced  income  concentration  in 
Spain.  By  1953,  the  composition of  top  incomes  had  changed  significantly 
relative to 1941: the fraction of non-farm business income has dropped from 
26% to 9% while the fraction of farm business income has increased from less 
than  5%  to  over  20%.
26  This  suggests  that  the  closing  of  the  Spanish 
economy  in  the  1940s  lead  to  a  sharp  reduction  in  successful  non-farm 
business  enterprises  and  as  a  result,  non-farm  business  owners  were 
replaced by large farm business owners at the top of the distribution. 
Third,  top  income  concentration  estimated with  income  tax  statistics 
remains around 0.6% from 1953 to 1971, the last year for which old income 
tax statistics are available, suggesting that the high economic growth starting 
the  1950s  did  not  bring  a  significant  change  in  income  concentration. 
Interestingly,  the  level  of  income  concentration  measured  with  the  new 
income tax statistics in the early 1980s is quite similar to the level of 1971. 
Assuming  again  a  constant  level  of  enforcement  from  1971  to  1981,  this 
suggests  that  the  transition  from  dictatorship  to  democracy  was  not 
associated with a significant change in income concentration. Comparing the 
change  in  income  composition  in  the  top  0.05%  from  1961  to  1981  is 
interesting: in the capital income category, there is a dramatic shift away from 
                                                                                                                                          
did not find compelling arguments showing that enforcement at the top was particularly poor 
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real estate to financial assets and in the business income category, there is a 
dramatic shift away from farm income toward non farm business income. This 
shows  that  the  very  fast  economic  expansion  from  1961  to  1981  made 
traditional land and farm owners fall behind other business owners at the top 
of the distribution. Our top income share series show, however, that such a 
shift took place with no change in overall income concentration. 
Finally, Figure 2 shows that there are fluctuations in very top income 
concentration since 1981 with sharp increases in the late 1980s and the late 
1990s. At the peak of 2000, top 0.01% income earners captured 0.86% of 
total income while they earned only 0.53% of total income in 1993. 
In light of our discussion in the introduction about the specific economic 
and  political  trajectory  of  the  Spanish  economy  relative  to  other  western 
countries  analyzed  previously,  it  is  interesting  to  compare  the  trends  in 
income concentration between Spain and other countries. Figure 3 displays 
the  top  0.01%  income  share  in  Spain,  France  (from  Piketty,  2001  and 
Landais, 2007), and the United States (Piketty and Saez, 2003). Two points 
are worth noting. 
First, Spain starts with a level of income concentration in the 1930s that 
is  slightly  lower  than  France  or  the  United  States.  However,  income 
concentration in France and the United States falls more sharply than in Spain 
during  World  War  II.  Therefore,  from  the  mid-1940s  to  1971,  income 
concentration  across  the  three  countries  is  actually  strikingly  close.
27  This 
shows that the number of high income taxpayers is not inherently too low in 
Spain relative to other countries and supports our claim that enforcement at 
the top of the distribution was plausibly comparable across Spain and other 
Western countries. Second, although income concentration has increased in 
Spain  in  recent  decades,  this  increase  is  very  small  relative  to  the  surge 
experienced  by  top  incomes  in  the  United  States.  Thus,  the  Spanish 
                                                                                                                                          
26 The share of capital income from financial assets drops slightly from 36% to 29% and the 
share of labor income increases slightly from 13% to 19% from 1941 to 1953. 
27 The series are estimated using similar methodologies across countries although there are 
of course differences in the details. However, it is important to note that the denominator (as a 
fraction of GDP) is comparable across countries and around 60% to 65%. It is actually slightly 
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experience is actually closer to the one of continental Europe countries such 
as France than Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States.
28 
 
3.2. Detailed analysis since 1981 
 
 The  tax  statistics  since  1981  are  much  more  detailed  than  the  old 
income tax statistics. Thus, we can study larger income groups such as the 
top 10% since 1981.  
Figure 4 displays top income shares for three groups within the top 
decile: the bottom half of the top decile (top 10-5%), the next 4% (top 5-1%), 
and the top percentile. In contrast to Figure 2, we now include realized capital 
gains in the top income shares.
29 The figure shows that those top income 
shares have evolved quite differently: the top 1% increased very significantly 
from 7.7% in 1981 up to 10.2% in 2004. In contrast, the top 10-5%, and the 
top 5-1% shares actually slightly declined from 1981 and in 2004, with very 
modest fluctuations throughout the period. Therefore the increase in income 
concentration,  which  took  place  in  Spain  since  1981,  has  been  a 
phenomenon concentrated within the top 1% of the distribution. This result 
could not have been derived from survey data, which have too small samples 
and top coding issues to reliably study the top 1%. 
 Figure 5 illustrates this concentration phenomenon further by splitting 
the top 1% into three groups: the top 1-0.5%, the top 0.5-0.1%, and the top 
0.1%. As in Figure 4, the higher the fractile, the higher the increase in the 
share from 1981 to 2004: the top 1-0.5% increases modestly from 2.7 to 2.9 
percent  while  the  top  0.1%  increases  sharply  by  over  80%  from  2  to  3.6 
percent. 
In order to understand the mechanisms behind this increase in income 
concentration at the top, we next turn to the analysis of the composition of top 
incomes. 
                                                 
28  The  studies  gathered  in  Atkinson  and  Piketty  (2007)  show  that  Anglo-Saxon  countries 
experienced a dramatic increase in income concentration in recent decades while continental 
European countries experiences either no or small increases in income concentration. 
29 To a large extent, realized capital gains were not taxed (and hence not reported) under the 
old income tax. Therefore, for comparison purposes, we also excluded realized capital gains 
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Figure 6 displays the share and composition of the top 0.1% income 
fractile from 1981 to 2004. The figure shows that the increase in the top 0.1% 
income  share  is  due  solely  to  two  components:  realized  capital  gains  and 
wage income. The remaining two components: business income and capital 
income have stayed about constant. The figure shows also that the 1986-
1988 spike was primarily a capital gains phenomenon. In contrast, the wage 
income increase has been a slow but persistent effect, which has taken place 
throughout the full period. Capital gains tend to be volatile from year to year 
as they follow closely the large swings of the stock market. Indeed, Figure 7 
displays the total real amounts of capital gains reported by the top 1% income 
earners along with the Madrid SE stock index from Global Financial data on a 
log  scale  from  1981  to  2004.  The  two  series  are  strikingly  correlated. 
Therefore,  the  capital  gain  component  reflects  largely  stock  market 
fluctuations.  High-income  individuals  own  a  disproportionate  fraction  of 
corporate stock in the economy. When stock prices increase sharply as in the 
late 1980s or late 1990s, high incomes get a disproportionate share of the 
corresponding capital gains, explaining why top income shares tend to follow 
the stock market cycles. 
Figure  8  reports  series  of  wage  concentration  (based  on  micro  tax 
statistics) for the period 1982-2002. It is important to keep in mind that those 
series capture only wage income concentration and hence are silent about 
changes in business and capital income concentration. The wage series for 
1982-2002  based  on  tax  return  data  show  that  there  has  been  a  steady 
increase in wage concentration during the last two decades. This increase 
has taken place primarily within the top 1%, which has increased significantly 
from 4.3% in 1982 to 6.5% in 2002. 
 
4. Top Wealth Shares and Composition 
 
In order to cast light on the capital income component of the income 
concentration  series  we  discussed,  we  now  turn  to  top  wealth  shares 
estimated  from  the  wealth  tax  statistics.  Figure  9  displays  the  evolution  of 
average wealth (total net worth of the household sector divided by the total 
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2004. Those average wealth statistics come solely from National Accounts 
and are hence fully independent from wealth tax statistics. 
Three  elements  should  be  noted.  First,  wealth  has  increased  very 
quickly during that period, substantially faster than average income: average 
wealth in 2004 is 2.4 times higher than in 1982 while average income in 2004 
is only 1.5 times higher than in 1982. Second, real estate is an extremely 
large  fraction  of  total  wealth.  It  represents  about  80%  of  total  wealth 
throughout the period. Third and related, the growth in average wealth has 
been driven primarily by real estate price increases, and to a smaller degree 
by an increase in corporate stock prices. In contrast, fixed claim assets have 
grown little during the period. 
Figure  10  displays  the  composition  of  wealth  in  top  fractiles  of  the 
wealth distribution in 1982 and 1999. As one would expect, the share of real 
estate is declining and the share of stocks is increasing as we move up the 
wealth distribution. It is notable that real estate still represents over 60% of 
wealth for the bottom half of the top percentile. Thus, only the very rich hold a 
substantial share of their wealth in the form of stock holdings. The patterns in 
1982 and 1999 are quite similar except that the level of stock ownership is 
higher across the board in 1999, a year with high stock market prices. Those 
compositional patterns suggest that an increase in real estate price will benefit 
relatively less the very top and should therefore reduce the very top wealth 
shares. In contrast, an increase in stock prices will benefit disproportionately 
the very rich and should increase the very top wealth shares. 
Figure 11 displays the top 1% wealth share (net worth including real 
estate  wealth)  along  with  the  top  1%  financial  wealth  share  (net  worth 
excluding  real  estate  wealth  and  mortgage  debts).  Unsurprisingly,  the  top 
financial wealth share is larger than the top wealth share because financial 
wealth  is  more  concentrated  than  real  estate  wealth.  Top  financial  wealth 
concentration is stable around 25% from 1982 to 1990, decreases to about 
21% from 1990 to 1995 and then increases again to about 26% by 2004. In 
contrast the top 1% wealth share including real estate is much more stable 
and fluctuates within a narrow band between 16 and 18 percent. In contrast to 
financial wealth, total wealth concentration does not fall from 1990 to 1995 
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and this advantages top wealth holders. The reverse happens from 1995 to 
2004:  in  contrast  to  financial  wealth,  total  wealth  concentration  does  not 
increase because real estate prices increase sharply.  
Figure 12 decomposes the top 1% total wealth share into three groups: 
the top 0.1%, the next 0.4%, and the bottom half of the top percentile. The 
graph  shows  that  those  top  wealth  groups  have  experienced  different 
patterns. The top 0.1% share has fallen substantially from 8% in 1982 to 5% 
by 2004. In contrast, the top 1-0.5% has increased from 4.3 to 5.2 percent 
and the top 0.5-0.1% has slightly decreased from 7.6 to 7.2 percent. Those 
differential  patterns  are  due  primarily  to  composition  effects:  the  bottom 
groups in the top percentile hold mostly real estate and have benefited from 
the surge in real estate prices. In contrast, the top 0.1% has been hit by the 
sharp  real  estate  prices  increases  from  1986  to  1991  (see  Figure  9). The 
improvement in real estate prices from 1997 to 2004 has been compensated 
by a surge in stock prices leading to an overall flat pattern for the top 0.1% 
wealth share during this period. 
Figure 13 displays the wealth composition of top 0.1% wealth holders 
from 1982 to 2004. It shows that the shares of real estate, business assets, 
and fixed claim assets have been decreasing and that the share of stocks has 
been  increasing  but  not  enough  to  compensate  for  the  fall  in  the  other 
components. Therefore, over the last two decades, the dramatic increase in 
real  estate  prices  has  been  the  primary  cause  of  the  reduction  in  the 
concentration of wealth in Spain.  
In  2002  the  Bank  of  Spain  conducted  a  household  wealth  survey 
whose  preliminary  results  are presented  in Bover,  2004.  It  is  instructive  to 
compare the wealth reported on wealth tax returns with the wealth reported in 
the survey. The complete comparison is reported in Table E3 in the appendix. 
Three important findings emerge. 
First,  we  find  that  wealth  reported  on  wealth  tax  statistics  for  top 
income groups such as the top 1% is higher than the wealth reported on the 
survey  by  the  top  1%,  even  under  the  assumption  that  all  the  household 
wealth belongs to the head of household. For example, including real estate, 
the average top 1% wealth from tax returns is 1.8 million Euros while it is only 
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clear that tax evasion for the wealth tax is pervasive as wealthy individuals 
seem to report more wealth for tax purposes than for the survey purposes. 
Second, the total wealth reported in the survey (and especially financial 
wealth) is substantially lower than the aggregates from National Accounts that 
we use as the denominator. For example, the survey reports total wealth of 
about 2,000 billion Euros while National Accounts report total wealth of about 
3,000 billions Euros. This suggests that households are under-reporting their 
wealth  in  the  survey  or  that  the  survey  might  not  have  been  sampled 
adequately  to  reflect  a  fully  representative  cross  section  of  Spanish 
households. 
Finally,  because  the  gap  in  the  aggregate  between  the  survey  and 
National Accounts and the gap for top groups between the survey and the 
wealth  tax  data  are  of  comparable  magnitude,  our  top  wealth  shares 
computed  using  wealth  tax  statistics  and  National  Accounts  for  the 
denominator are relatively close to the top wealth shares computed internally 
from the survey (using as denominator total survey wealth). 
 
5. The Erosion of the Wealth Tax Base 
 
In 1994, an exemption for business owners substantially involved in the 
management  of  their  business  was  introduced  in  the  wealth  tax.  More 
precisely, stocks of corporations where the individual owns at least 15%, or 
the  individual  and  family  own  at  least  20%,  and  where  the  individual  is 
substantially engaged in this business activity (getting over 50% of his labor 
and business income from this activity) is exempted from the wealth tax. The 
value of those stocks still has to be reported to the fiscal administration and 
was included in our top wealth share series. The exemption was introduced in 
December 1993 for the first time, affecting wealth held by the end of 1994 
(reported in 1995). Importantly for the empirical analysis below, the exemption 
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requirement was lowered from 20% to 15%) and in tax year 1997 (when the 
20% family ownership criteria was introduced).
30 
 
5.1 Conceptual Model 
 
In principle, the 1994 wealth tax reform could have two effects. First, 
the  tax  cut  for  exempted  business  might  spur  business  activity  in  the 
exempted sector. We call this effect the supply side effect. Second, the tax cut 
for  exempted  business  might  induce  some  businesses,  which  did  not 
originally meet the exemption criteria, to shift to the exempt sector in order to 
benefit from the tax cut. For example, business owners could increase their 
share of stock in the company in order to meet the 15% ownership threshold. 
Alternatively, they might become active managers in their businesses or drop 
other work activities outside the business. A business owner would be willing 
to shift to the exempt sector as long as the costs of shifting are less than the 
tax  savings.  We  call  this  effect  the  shifting  effect.  In  this  subsection,  we 
construct a simple model to capture those two effects and we propose an 
empirical  application  using  our  constructed  wealth  series  in  the  following 
subsection.
31  
We  assume  that  business  owners have  an objective  function  of  the 
form 
  
c   h(z) where 
  
z is pre-tax profits, 
  
c is net-of-tax profits, and 
  
h(z) is an 
increasing  and  convex  function  representing  the  costs  of  earning  higher 
profits. Those  costs represent  labor  input  costs  (including  the  labor  supply 
cost of the business owner if he is an active manager) and also capital input 
costs. The quasi-linear form of the objective function amounts to assuming 
away income effects or risk aversion effects, which simplifies the derivations 
                                                 
30 For tax year 2003 (beyond our study), the individual ownership requirement was further 
reduced from 15% to 5%. 
31 To the best of our knowledge, such a model has not been presented before in the literature 
on  the  efficiency  costs  of  taxation.  It  could  be  easily  applied  to  other  tax  settings.  For 
example, in the United States, the issue of shifting business profits from the corporate income 
tax base to the individual income tax base has received a lot of attention (see e.g., Slemrod, 
1995,  1996,  Gordon  and  Slemrod,  2000,  Saez,  2004).  Such  shifting  occurs  because 
businesses meeting specific criteria (number of shareholders) can elect to be taxed directly at 
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and the welfare analysis.
32 Furthermore, we assume that the business owner 
can pay a cost 
  
q   0 in order to meet the tax exemption status. Such costs 
represent for example the costs of increasing the business ownership to 15% 
or the opportunity costs of dropping outside work activities to meet the labor 
income  requirement.  We  assume  that 
  
q  is  distributed  according  to  a 
cumulated distribution 
  
P(q). A fraction 
  
P0 = P(q = 0) of businesses meet those 
criteria even in the absence of the tax preference. In reality, businesses differ 
in size, which could be modeled through heterogeneity in the cost function 
  
h(z). However, as we consider only linear taxation (which is an approximation 
to  the  actual  progressive  tax  system),  the  distribution  of  business  sizes  is 
irrelevant for the analysis and hence we assume that businesses differ only in 
  
q. 
We assume that the tax rate on profits 
  
z in the taxed sector is 
  
 0 and 
that the tax rate in the exempt sector is 
  
 1 with of course 
  
 1    0. Note that 
  
 1 
is not necessarily zero as the business also faces corporate and individual 
income taxes. It is also important to note that we convert the wealth tax rate 
  
t 
into a tax rate 
  
  on profits using the standard formula 
  
  = t r where 
  
r is the 
normal annual return on assets. We denote by 
  
l the tax status of the business 
with 
  
l = 0 denoting the standard taxable status and 
  
l =1 the exempt status. 




l,z z(1  l)  h(z) q  l 
 







z(1  l)  h(z) which generates the first order 
condition 
  
1  l = h'(z). This equation captures the within sector supply side 
effect,  as  a  decrease  in 
  
 l  leads  to  an  increase  in 
  
zl  with  an  elasticity 
  
el = 1  l ( ) zl ( ) zl   1  l ( ) = h'(zl) zlh'' zl ( ) ( ). 
                                                 
32 Including income effects would not change the qualitative nature of our findings but would 
complicate  the  presentation,  as  we  would  have  to  introduce  compensated  elasticities  to 
capture efficiency costs in our formulas. In the case of wealthy business owners who actively 
work in their business, it seems plausible to assume that income effects are small (if income 
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Second,  the  business  chooses 
  
l.  We  denote  by 
  
Vl = maxz z 1  l ( )  h(z) [ ] the indirect utility in each taxable status 
  
l = 0,1 (not 
including the cost 
  
q of becoming tax exempt). Therefore, if 
  
q  V1  V0, then the 
exempt status 
  
l =1 is optimal, while if 
  
q >V1  V0, then 
  
l = 0 is optimal. As a 
result,  a  fraction 
  
P
* = P(V1  V0)  of  businesses  chooses  the  exempt  status. 
Using  the  envelope  theorem,  we  have 
  
 Vl   l =  zl .  Therefore, 
  
 P
*   0 = p V1  V0 ( )  z0  and 
  
 P
*   1 =  p V1  V0 ( )  z1,  where 
  
p q ( )  denotes  the 
density of the distribution 
  
P q ( ). Unsurprisingly, if there are firms on the margin 
between the tax exempt and taxable status, then increasing the tax 
  
 0 in the 
taxable sector generates a shift toward the tax-exempt sector. Conversely, 
reducing the tax advantage of the exempt sector by increasing 
  
 1 reduces the 
number of firms in the tax-exempt sector. 
We  denote  by 
  
T = 1  P
* ( )  0z0 + P
* 1z1  the  total  tax  revenue  and  by 
  
W = 1  P
* ( )V0 + V1  q ( )d
0
V1 V0   P q ( ) the private surplus in the economy. Social 
surplus is 
  





= 1  P































        (2) 
 
The first term (equal to one) inside the square brackets of (1) and (2) 
represents  the  mechanical  increase  in  tax  revenue  absent  any  behavioral 
response. The last two terms inside the square brackets represent the loss of 
tax revenue due to the supply side effect and the shifting effect respectively. 
The  reduction  in  private  surplus  due  to  the  tax  change  is  equal  to  the 
mechanical tax increase (absent behavioral responses).
33 Therefore, the last 
two terms represent the net effect on social surplus SW of the tax increase or 
equivalently  (minus)  the  marginal  deadweight  burden  of  increasing  taxes. 
Absent  shifting  effects 
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showing that the marginal loss in tax revenue (per dollar) is proportional to the 
supply side elasticity 
  
e and the tax rate 
  
 . 
If  the  tax  rate 
  
 0  in  the  taxable  sector  is  below  the  Laffer  rate 
maximizing tax revenue (when taking into account only supply side effects) 
then 
  
 0z0 >  1z1. Therefore, equation (1) shows that shifting effects increase 
the marginal deadweight burden of increasing the tax in the taxable sector. In 
contrast,  equation  (2)  shows  that  shifting  effects  decrease  the  marginal 
deadweight burden of increasing the tax in the exempt sector. The economic 
intuition is transparent: increasing the tax differential across the two sectors 
leads to more shifting: the marginal shifters spend 
  
q for a tax saving equal to 
  
q, which is pure deadweight burden. Strikingly, in the extreme case where 
  
 1 = 0,
34 
  
 SW   1 = p
* 0z0 P
*: social surplus increases with an increase in 
  
 1 
no  matter  how  large  the  supply  side  effect  in  the  tax  exempt  sector  is. 
Therefore,  providing  a  wealth  tax  exemption  for  businesses  meeting  some 
specific set of criteria has two opposite effects on social surplus. First, it has a 
positive  effect  on  social  surplus  through  the  standard  supply  side  effect: 
exempt businesses face lower taxes and hence might expand their economic 
activity.  This  effect  is  measured  through  the  supply  side  elasticity 
  
e.  This 
leads to an increase in business activity and hence reported business wealth 
in the exempt sector with no effect on the taxable sector. Second, however, 
the exemption might induce some businesses to shift to the exempt status 
and waste resources in doing so. This shifting effect leads to an increase in 
reported business wealth in the exempt sector, which comes at the expense 
of reported business wealth in the taxable sector. We propose an empirical 
estimation using our wealth composition series below. 
 
5.2 Empirical Estimation 
 
                                                                                                                                          
33 This can be seen directly from the fact that 
  
 Vl   l =  zl, which is a direct consequence 
of the envelope theorem. 
34 As we discussed above, even though business owners benefiting from the exemption are 
exempt from the wealth tax, business owners still pay income taxes on the profits so that in 
reality 
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Figure 14 displays the composition and share of financial wealth held 
by  the  top  0.01%  wealth  holders.  Stocks  are  now  divided  into  three 
components: publicly traded stock, taxable closely held stocks, and exempted 
closely  held  stock.  In  1994,  the  first  year  the  exemption  was  introduced, 
exempted stock represents only about 15% of total closely held stock reported 
by the top 0.01%. By 2002, the fraction has grown to 77%. Presumably, in 
1994, individuals did not have time to reorganize substantially their business 
activity. Therefore, the 15% fraction of closely held stock benefiting from the 
exemption in 1994 must be close or just slightly above the fraction of closely 
held  stock  which  would  benefit  from  the  exemption  absent  any  behavioral 
response  to  the  introduction  of  the  exemption.
35  The  fraction  of  business 
exempt  wealth  grows  enormously  from  1994  to  2002,  which  is  consistent 
either  with  a  very  large  supply  side  effect  or  a  significant  shifting  effect. 
However, the fraction of taxable closely held stocks shrinks significantly from 
1994 to 2002 which strongly suggests that the great increase in tax exempt 
wealth comes, at least in part, at the expense of taxable wealth through the 
shifting channel. We use our series to quantify the relative size of each effect. 
We propose a simple quantitative analysis using our estimated series 
and the model described above. Let us assume that, taking the tax or exempt 
status as fixed, business wealth is given by 
  




  is the total 
tax rate (including income and wealth taxes) on profits, 
  
e is the supply side 
elasticity, and 
  
z  is potential wealth absent any taxes. We assume that the 
fraction of businesses in the tax-exempt sector is given by 
  
P = P  0, 1 ( ). We 
use subscript 
  
b to denote before reform variables and subscript 
  
a to denote 
after  reform  variables.  Hence 
  
Pb  is  the  fraction  of  businesses  meeting  the 
exemption criteria just before the reform and 
  
Pa is the fraction of businesses 
meeting the exemption criteria after the reform. Hence 
  
Pb   Pa captures the 
shifting effect (purged from the supply side effect) 
For a given top group (such as the top 1% or the top 0.01%), after the 
reform, we observe exempt closely held stocks 
  
Paz  a 1  0 ( )
e
 and non-exempt 
                                                 
35  Those  would  be  businesses  for  which  the  cost  of  shifting 
  
q  was  zero  because  the 
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closely held stock 
  
1  Pa ( )z  a 1  1 ( )
e
. Before the reform, we observe only the 
total closely held stocks held by the top group 
  
Pbz  b 1  0 ( )
e + 1  Pb ( )z  b 1  0 ( )
e
 
as there is no distinction between taxable and exempt stock. 
We estimate 
  
 0 and 
  
 1 as the sum of the income tax on profits and the 
wealth tax. We assume that the income tax on profits (corporate income tax if 
the  business  is  incorporated  or  individual  income  tax  is  the  business  is 
unincorporated and taxed directly at the individual level) is 30% for the top 1% 
wealth holders and 40% for top 0.01% holders. We assume that the wealth 
tax rate (when the business is taxable) is 0.8% of the value of assets for the 
top 1% and 1.3% for the top 0.01%.
36 We convert wealth tax rates into an 
implicit  tax  on  profits  assuming  a  return  rate  on  assets  equal  to  5%. 
Therefore, the total tax rates on profits for non-exempt businesses are 46% 
and  66%  for  the  top  1%  and  top  0.01%  respectively.  Although  there  is 
significant  uncertainty  about  the  exact  tax  rates,  they  only  affect  the 
estimation of 
  











Pb, and the 
two auxiliary variables 
  
z  a and 
  
z  b from the three observed quantities, we need 
to  make  two  important  additional  assumptions.  First,  we  assume  that  the 
fraction  of  closely  held  stocks  meeting  the  exemption  criteria  before  the 
reform 
  
Pb is given by the observed fraction of stocks meeting the exemption 
the  first  year  the  reform  is  implemented.  This  assumption  is  reasonable  if 
businesses do not have time to respond to the tax change in the first year 
after the reform. In any case, if businesses start responding in the first year, 
then we will over-estimate 
  
Pb, hence under-estimate the shifting effect 
  
Pa   Pb 
and overestimate the supply side elasticity 
  
e.
37 In the empirical estimation, we 
need to take into account the fact that the wealth tax exemption criteria were 
                                                 
36 Those estimates are based on the tabulated data. The wealth tax rates go from 0.2% in the 
lowest bracket to 2.5% in the top bracket but the effective tax rates are substantially lower 
due to numerous exemptions. 
37  A  counter  argument  could  be  that  business  owners  did  not  know  about  the  wealth  tax 
exemption in the first year after the reform and hence failed to claim it even in cases where 
they were fully eligible. This argument is difficult to believe in the case of large wealth holders 
who use tax accountants to file their taxes. More broadly, the costs of learning about complex 
tax exemptions can be incorporated into the cost 
  
q of meeting the exemption criteria and our 
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relaxed in 1995 and in 1997. Therefore, we assume that the growth in the 
fraction exempt from 1994 to 1995 and from 1996 to 1997 is entirely due to 
the relaxation of the criteria (and hence that the fraction exempt would have 
stayed constant absent the relaxation). This is a very conservative estimation 
as the fraction exempt grows in every single year from 1994 to 2002. As a 
result,  we  assume  that  the  fraction  exempt  (before  the  reform)  is  actually 
about twice as large as the fraction actually exempt in 1994. This conservative 
assumption leads to a conservative estimate of the shifting effect. 
Second,  we  assume  that,  absent  any  tax  change,  total  closely  held 
stocks (taxable and non-taxable) would have grown at a rate 
  
g equal to the 
growth  rate  of  other  financial  assets  held  by  the  top  1%.  In  that  case, 
  
z  a = (1+ g)  z  b where 
  
1+ g is taken as the ratio of other financial assets held by 
the top 1% after and before the reform. This is clearly a strong assumption. 
Using our pre-reform series, we show that it holds as a first approximation in 
the pre-reform period.
38 Panel A of Table 2 presents those key parameters for 
the top 1% (left panel) and for the top 0.01% (right panel) for various choices 
for the pre-reform base year and the post-reform year. 







Pb, (Panel B in Table 2) as well as evaluate the tax and 
efficiency consequences (Panel C in Table 2). Three important results arise 
from this exercise. First and most important, all the estimates robustly suggest 
that there is a very large shifting effect: the fraction of businesses benefiting 
from the exemption jumps from less than 1/3 to about 2/3 for the top 1%. The 
shifting is even more extreme for the top 0.01% and goes from 37% exempt to 
over  80%  exempt.  It  is  important  to  reiterate  that  this  represents  the  pure 
shifting effect (controlling for the supply side effect).
39 Of course such a large 
shifting effect is not surprising in light of Figure 14 which showed a striking 
drop in taxable closely held wealth compensated by an increase in exempt 
                                                 
38 For example from 1982 to 1993, among the top 1%, the (real) growth of other financial 
assets was 63% while the growth of closely held stocks was 44%. However from 1987 to 
1993, closely held stock (in the top 1%) grew faster (37%) than other financial assets (17%). 
39 Such shifting effects are quite robust to assuming a rate of growth of closely held stock that 
is slower (absent any tax change) than other financial assets. For example, one would have 
to assume that closely held assets would have declined by 15% in real terms from 1993 to 
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closely held wealth. Second, the estimates for the supply side elasticity are 
sensitive  to  the  choice  of  the  comparison  years  and  hence  cannot  be 
estimated precisely with our series.
40 However, the elasticity estimates are 
never  extremely  large  and  are  often  around  zero  (or  even  negative).  This 
shows that the data series do not display consistent evidence of a very large 
supply side effect. Third and finally, Panel C shows that the combination of 
large  shifting  effects  with  moderate  supply  side  elasticity  implies  that  the 
actual tax loss due to the reform is much larger than the predicted tax loss of 
the reform absent any behavioral response. Even in the case of column (1) 
where the supply side elasticity 
  
e is largest and equal to 0.83, the actual loss 
in tax revenue from the top 1% wealth holders is larger than the loss in tax 
revenue assuming no behavioral response. When the supply side elasticity 
estimate is smaller, the loss in tax revenue with behavioral responses can be 
three  to  four  times  larger  than  with  no  behavioral  responses.  As  our 
theoretical  model  showed,  the  difference  between  actual  changes  in  tax 
revenue  and  predicted  changes  in  tax  revenue  (absent  the  behavioral 
response) are a measure of the efficiency costs of the tax change.
41 The last 
row in Table 2 displays such an estimated change in total surplus due to the 
tax change. 
Therefore, our estimates suggest that the wealth tax exemption was a 
very inefficient way to provide tax relief: the welfare gain to taxpayers was 
substantially smaller than the loss in tax revenue because resources were 
dissipated by taxpayers in meeting the tax exemption criteria. This ends up 
increasing  the  deadweight  burden  of  taxation  as  individuals  change  their 
behavior  in  order  to  benefit  from  the  tax  reductions  (Feldstein, 1999).  Our 
empirical  analysis  could  be  made  more  precise  using  directly  longitudinal 
micro-data on wealth taxpayers. Such data could provide direct evidence of 
shifting and of shifting costs.
42 
                                                                                                                                          
unrealistic given the growth that closely held stock experienced in the pre-tax reform period 
from 1982 to 1993. 
40 In contrast to shifting parameters, 
  
e is also sensitive to the assumption about the growth 
rate 
  
g of closely held assets absent the tax change. 
41 This is exactly true in the case of small tax changes. In the case of the relatively large 
change we are considering, this is only a first order approximation. 
42 Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain access to such data and it is unlikely that 












































This paper has attempted to analyze income and wealth concentration 
in Spain from a long-run perspective using the income tax statistics evidence. 
We  recognize  that  our  data  sources,  especially  before  the  return  to 
democracy,  cover  only  the  very  top  of  the  income  distribution  so  that  we 
cannot  speak  to  overall  income  inequality  patterns.  We  have  argued, 
however, that the extent of tax evasion at the top of the distribution, was likely 
much lower than commonly thought and that, as a result, those tax statistics 
can cast new useful light on the patterns of income concentration in Spain 
before the return to democracy. 
Our results show that income concentration was much higher during 
the 1930s than it is today: the top 0.01% income share was about twice as 
high  in  the  1930s  than  over  the  last  two  decades.  Income  concentration 
dropped during the 1940s and remained fairly stable throughout the Spanish 
economic miracle from the 1950s to the 1970s. During the last two decades, 
income  concentration  has  increased  significantly  and  this  phenomenon  is 
concentrated in the top 1%, and especially in the top fractiles within the top 
1%. A large fraction of the increase is due to a surge in realized capital gains 
following the stock market boom of the late 1990s and since 2002. The data 
also show evidence of an increase in top salaries, which has contributed to 
the increase in top income shares. It should be noted that the increase in 
income  concentration  in  Spain  is  much  smaller  than  the  increase  in 
concentration that took place in the United States. 
 Wealth concentration in Spain has declined modestly since 1982. The 
sharp  increase  in  real  estate  prices,  which  tend  to  reduce  wealth 
concentration,  have  been  to  a  large  extent  offset  by  large  stock  price 
increases, leaving the overall wealth concentration relatively stable. 
The exemption of stocks from the wealth tax base for business owners 
actively involved in managing their business introduced in 1994 constitutes a 
striking  example  of  the  perverse  effects  of  eroding  the  tax  base,  both  on 
efficiency and redistributive grounds. This exemption had a minor effect on 








































1  30 
by  about  40%,  weakening  substantially  the  redistributive  effects  of  the 
progressive wealth tax. Furthermore, the erosion of the tax base has been 
due primarily to wealthy business owners shifting from the taxable status to 
the non-taxable status. This suggests that, not only the costs of the tax cut are 
much higher than predicted based on a scenario with no behavioral response, 
but also that those tax losses create substantial additional deadweight burden 
as  business  owners  expend  significant  resources  to  qualify  for  the  non-













































A. The Income and Wealth Tax in Spain 
 
A.1.The “old” income tax 
 
After  six  unsuccessful  attempts  since  1910,  the  first  personal  income  tax 
(Contribución General sobre la Renta) was established in all the territory of 
Spain, including Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, in 1932 (Law 20/12/1932) during the 
Second Republic. Based on their historical autarky privileges, Navarra and 
Alava were excluded since 1937 and 1943 respectively.
43 
Taxable  income  included  income  from  real estate,  capital, rural  and 
mining  activities,  commercial  and  industrial  business,  labor  and  pensions. 
Mainly due to the narrow managerial capabilities of the government, this first 
law determined a high taxable income threshold (100,000 pesetas lowered to 
80,000 pesetas in 1936) together with low progressive rates, ranging from 1% 
to 11% (Table F1). In 1933 there were only 1,446 tax returns and income tax 
collection represented 0.03% of GDP and 0.35% of total tax collection (Table 
B3  and  Table  G).  The  income  tax  was  based  on  individual  income  (as 
opposed to family income) from 1933 to 1939. 
The fiscal reform of 1940 (Law 16/12/1940), which made changes in 
the whole tax system, was mainly motivated by the need to increase fiscal 
revenues  to  solve  the  post  civil  war  problems  and  to  cancel  war  debts. 
Consequently,  the  reform  relied  on  the  traditional  schedule  income  and 
consumption  taxes,  which  were  much  easier  to  collect.  Concerning  the 
Contribución  sobre  la  Renta,  it  reduced  the  minimum  taxable  income  to 
70,000 pesetas and substantially increased the progressivity of the rates, with 
a top marginal tax rate of 40% for incomes above 1,000,000 pesetas. It also 
raised the taxes on lower incomes, with the minimum tax rate jumping from 
1% to 7.5%.  It introduced family deductions and a supplementary 30% rate 
for single individuals. The new law applied to 1941 incomes. From 1940 on, 
the income tax was based on family income (instead of individual income from 
1933 to 1939). 
Tax  rates  were  further  increased  in  1942  (Law  6/2/1943),  when  the 
minimum  threshold  was  set  to  60,000  pesetas.  Two  new  reforms  (Law 
16/12/1953 and Law 26/12/1957) failed to generalize the coverage of the tax. 
The definition of “unjustified wealth gains” (defined as those which could not 
                                                 
43  The  autarky  regimes  governing  the  territories  of  Navarra  and  País  Vasco  and  their 
relationship with the central administration is not a new issue in the history of Spain. Those 
regimes date back to the XV century. More recently, Navarra’s privilegies were regulated by 
the  Ley  Paccionada  (1841).  The  Régimen  de  Concierto  was  negotiated  with  Alava, 
Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya in 1877, for which the provinces were responsible for the collection of 
national administration taxes while making lump sum transfers to Madrid.  The 1936-1939 
civil war and Franco’s policy towards ‘traitor’ local nationalisms changed the scenario. On the 
one hand, Alava and Navarra received a preferential treatment and kept their prerogatives 
after their contribution to the war on Franco’s side. On the other, the autarky of Vizcaya and 
Guipúzcoa  was  abolished  in  1937  (Decree  Law  23/6/1937),  even  before  the  conflict  had 









































1  32 
be explained by declared income flows) for audit purposes helped improve the 
inspection results, and had a positive impact on the tax collection. 
By the mid-1960s the Contribución had been pushed down in the fiscal 
agenda.
44  The stabilization plan of 1959 had been extremely successful in 
terms of government revenues so the tax reform of 1964 was not motivated 
by fiscal deficits but to promote growth and development. The Law 11/6/1964 
and the Decree 27/11/1967 made the valuation of taxable income dependent 
on  the  system  of  schedule  taxes.
45  Consequently  the  personal  income  tax 
completely lost its autonomy. Theoretically there were no minimum threshold 
to file; however, the usual obligation began at 200,000-300,000 pesetas. Tax 
rates ranged from 15% to 61.4%, with an average maximum rate of 50%.  
The  collection  results  were  well  below  expectations  again  and  the 
situation remained unchanged after the reforms of 1973 and 1975 (Decree 
Laws 12/1973 and 13/1975). The top marginal rate was reduced to 56.12% 
with  an  average  maximum  rate  of  40%.  Finally,  and  just  before  the 
introduction of the modern income tax in 1979, the law 50/1977 offered a tax 
amnesty 1976; this was a success as 213,000 tax filers responded positively. 
 
A.2. The modern income tax 
 
The  modern  income  tax  was  established  in  1979  (Law  44/1978),  with  two 
major reforms in 1991 and 1998. Albi (2006) provides a detailed description of 
the current system along with all the reforms from 1979 to date. 
From  1984  to  1987  the  top  marginal  rate  was  66%;  however  the 
average tax rate could not exceed 46%. In 1988 the tax scale was completely 
restructured downwards; the top marginal rate decreased from 66% to 56%, 
but the 46% limit was eliminated (Table A1, column 9).  
The  reform  of  1991  did  not  modify  either  the  tax  rates  or  the  main 
deductions. It updated the legislation in terms of individual and joint filing after 
the Constitutional Court decided in 1989 that the obligation to file jointly for 
married couples was thereafter unconstitutional. It also introduced changes in 
the taxation of capital gains, which we briefly describe below. 
Since the reform of 1998 (Law 40/1998), the system was not supposed 
to tax overall but disposable income, after the deduction of a personal and 
family  minimum  income  threshold (family-related  reductions existed  before, 
but they were applied to the amount of the tax and not to the income). For this 
reason, the joint-filer tax scale disappeared, so that the same scale applies to 
everybody since that year. The reform also meant a general rate reduction in 
the  marginal  rates.  The  drops  ranged  from  2%  (from  20%  to  18%  for  the 
bottom bracket) to 8% (from 56% to 48% for the top bracket). It also reduced 
the number of brackets from eight to six and eliminated the 0% rate for the 
lowest income. 
                                                 
44 A result of this diminishing relevance is the inexistence of official statistics between 1961 
and 1979. 
45 The powerful banking and industrial sectors, with strong influence in  the  dictatorship  of 
Franco, seem to have been the source of a systematic attempt to block any generalization of 
the Contribución sobre la Renta and to sustain the statu quo of the taxation scheme. See, for 
example, Albiñana, 1969a and Vallejo Pousada, 1995, for details on how some private banks 
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Concerning  capital  gains,  the  following  facts  are  worth  mentioning. 
Between 1978 and 1991, capital gains (excluding gratuitous inter-vivos and 
mortis causa transfers) were taxed as regular income, according to the tax 
rate scale. From 1992 to 2004, a distinction was made between short run (or 
‘regular’, meaning below one year) capital gains and long run (or ‘irregular’) 
capital gains. Short run capital gains are added to the main income and taxed 
according to the tax scale.  
Until 1998 long run capital gains were first corrected downwards by a 
coefficient depending both on the nature of the asset and the number of years 
the asset had been held (real estate, -5.26% per year; stock: -11.11% per 
year; -7.14% per year for other assets). Finally, the tax was computed as the 
maximum of (a) adding 50% of irregular capital gains to the regular income 
and  applying  the  tax  scale  to  the  result;  and  (b)  applying  the  individual 
average tax rate to 100% of the irregular gains. Since 1996 the average tax 
rate affecting irregular capital gains could not exceed 20%. 
From 1997 to  1998,  long  run  capital  gains generated  in  one  to two 
years continued to follow the rules described above. For those produced in 
more than two years, a 20% rate was applied only to any amount beyond 
200,000 pesetas. 
Since  1999  only  gains  generated  in  more  than  two  years  are 
considered “irregular” and consequently taxed in a different way from the rest 
of income, at a 20% rate (18% since 2002). 
 
 
A.3. The Wealth Tax 
 
The  Law  50/1977  established  a  “transitory”  and  “exceptional”  tax  on  net 
wealth, declared and paid annually at the same time as the income tax but on 
a separate form. Originally it was meant to serve as a control over the income 
tax,  with  limited  redistributive  goals.  Tax  filing  was  done  on  an  individual 
basis, with the exception of married couples under joint tenancy; joint filing 
was optional between 1988 and 1990. 
Concerning taxable wealth and valuation rules: (a) urban real estate 
was  valued  at  property  registry  values  (catastro),  corrected  by  coefficients 
which depended upon the year of construction; (b) rural real estate value was 
the result of capitalizing at 4% the amount fixed by the local estate tax; (c) 
checking,  savings  accounts  and  time  deposits  corresponded  to  the  annual 
average balance, net of any amount used to purchase other components of 
wealth or to cancel debts; (d) life insurance corresponded to recovery value; 
(e)  bonds  and  traded  stock,  at  the  monthly  average  price  during  the  last 
quarter; (f) closely held stock, at liquidating value; (g) small personal goods, 
3% of wealth below 20 million pesetas and 5% beyond; (h) other items, at 
market  prices  and  (i)  debts  at  nominal  value.  Urban  real  estate  declared 
historical  monuments  and  art  works  involved  in  cultural  activities  were 
exempted. 
Since  1992,  a  major  reform  by  the  Law  19/1991  put  an  end  to  the 
transitory an exceptional character of the tax. It established a strictly individual 
filing and introduced changes in some of the included components as well as 
in their valuation rules. In particular, (a) real estate is valued at the highest of 
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determined for other taxes; (b) checking, savings accounts and time deposits, 
valued at the highest of the final balance or the 4th quarter average balance; 
(c)  bonds and  traded  stock,  at  the  average  of market  price  during  the  4th 
quarter; (d) closely held stock, at the theoretical value according to the last 
audited balance; if the audit is still pending the value is obtained from the 
highest of the last audited balance or the average of the last three annual 
profits capitalized at 12.5%;
46 (e) life insurance at recovery value; (f) annuities 
at  capitalization  value;  (g)  art  works  and  antiques,  at  market  value;  (h) 
intellectual and industrial property rights, exempted if belonging to the original 
author and valued at purchasing prices otherwise; (i) other items, at market 
prices  and  (i)  debts,  at  nominal  value.  Small  personal  items  and  pension 
funds  are  not  taxed.  The  main  residence  was  exempted  up  to  25  million 
pesetas (150,253.03 euros) since 2000 (Law 6/2000). 
Of particular importance for Section 5 in the main text, the Law 22/1993 
introduced the following new exemptions, starting in 1994: 
(a)  Goods  necessary  for  business  activities  constituting  the  main 
income source, performed in a direct and personal way by the individual. 
(b) Closely held stocks of business corporations whenever all three of 
the following conditions were met:  
(i) the individual is substantially engaged in the business activity (he is 
the manager), getting over 50% of his total labor, business and professional 
income from it; 
(ii) the individual owns at least 20% of the capital; 
(iii)  the  corporation  is  not  involved  in  wealth  management  as  main 
activity. 
Since 1995 the minimum share requirement was reduced to 15% (Law 
42/1994)  for  the  individual,  and  set  to  20%  for  the  family  in  1997  (Law 
13/1996). In 1998, professional activities were also included in the exemption 
mentioned in (a) (Law 66/1997). In 2003, the individual ownership threshold 
was lowered to 5% (Law 51/2002).
47 
As of 1/1/1997 the wealth tax revenues were transferred to the local 
governments (Law 46/1996). 
 
B. References on data sources for Spain 
 
Table I summarizes the references on data sources for Spain. 
 
B.1 Tax Statistics 
 
Income tax statistical information covering the “old” income tax was published 
regularly  between  1933  and  1961:  Dirección  General  de  Rentas  Públicas, 
Estadística de la Contribución General sobre la Renta 1933-1934; Dirección 
General de Contribución sobre la Renta, Estadística de la Contribución sobre 
la Renta, 1935-1940, 1941,1942; Dirección General de Contribución sobre la 
Renta, Estadística de Servicios 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 
1950; Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección General de la Contribución sobre la 
Renta, Estadística de Servicios 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955; Ministerio de 
                                                 
46 Capitalization rate was raised to 20% in 1999 (Law 50/1998). 
47 In 1994 the fiscal authorities found it difficult to predict the results of the new exemptions 








































1  35 
Hacienda,  Dirección  General  de  Impuestos  sobre  la  Renta,  Estadística  de 
Servicios de la Contribución sobre la Renta 1956, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1962. 
Tables display the distribution of taxpayers by level of income together with 
taxable income and tax paid. 
There  are  no  official  income  tax  statistics  publications  from  1962  to 
1979. The Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (1973, 1974) has published a set of 
statistics  from  unofficial  sources  covering  total  tax  files  between  1963  and 
1974 together with the distribution of files by income brackets for 1971. 
Much  more  detailed  data  describe  the  evolution  of  the  income  and 
wealth taxes between 1981 and 2003: Agencia Estatal de la Administración 
Tributaria, Departamento de Informática Tributaria, Madrid, Estadísticas IRPF 
y Patrimonio 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000;  Dirección  General  de  Tributos,  Subdirección  General  de  Política 
Tributaria (2002), El Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas y el 
Impuesto sobre el Patrimonio en 1999; Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, 
Memoria  de  la  Administración  Tributaria,  1982-1983,  1984,    1985,  1986, 
1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005. 
 
B.2 Wages and Salaries 
 
Results displayed in Table D are based on the panel of individual income tax 
returns 1982-1998 (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Panel IRPF-AEAT) and the 
2002 sample of income tax files (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Muestra de 
Declarantes de IRPF 2002). Individual wage incomes are obtained from the 
corresponding box in the tax file. Therefore, Table D includes civil servants. 
As  for  the  denominator,  total  wages  and  salaries  are  defined  as  total 
employment  income  from  National  Accounts,  net  of  social  security,  and 
excluding  País  Vasco  and  Navarra.  Total  number  of  employees  is  total 
salaried employment from National Accounts. As the wages of spouses are 
aggregated for income tax purposes until 1987, we corrected estimates for 
1982-1987 along the same lines as explained in Appendix D.2. 
 
 
C. Wealth and Income Denominators 
 
C.1 Wealth Denominator 
 
In order to compute wealth shares we need to estimate the total personal 
wealth.  We  have  used  two  definitions  of  personal  wealth:  financial  wealth 
(wealth  excluding  pension  funds  -which  are  not  taxed-,  real  estate  and 
mortgage debt) and total wealth (including real estate and mortgage debt but 
still excluding pension funds). 
The wealth denominator relies on five statistical sources: 
(a) Banco de España (2005), Cuentas Financieras de la Economía Española 
1990-2005. Table II.21, Hogares e Instituciones sin fines de Lucro al servicio 
de los Hogares. 
(b)  Banco  de  España  (2004),  Encuesta  Financiera  de  las  Familias  (EEF): 
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(c)  Banco  de  España,  Indicadores  del  Mercado  de  la  Vivienda, 
www.bde.es/infoest/sindi.htm, Table sindi15. Data refer to averages in the 4th 
quarter between 1987 and 2004. 
(d)  Ministerio  de  Economía  y  Hacienda,  Dirección  General  de  Catastro, 
Estadísticas Catastrales 1990-2004. 
http://www.catastro.minhac.es/esp/estadisticas1.asp  
(e) Caixa de Catalunya (2004), Report Monográfico: El Crecimiento del Stock 
de Riqueza de las Familias Españolas y su Impacto sobre el Consumo en el 
Período 1995-2003: Una Version Territorial, in Informe sobre el Consumo y la 
Economía Familiar, June. 
 
Financial Wealth: Financial wealth is defined as the sum of bank deposits, 
currency holdings, stocks and investment funds, other fixed claim assets and 
insurance contracts on the asset side, minus commercial and other credit on 
the liability side.  To match the definition of taxable wealth, we do not include 
pension  funds.  Also  long  run  loans  are excluded  as  a  proxy  for  mortgage 
debt.  The data were selected from (a) and correspond to the 4th quarter, 
covering the period 1989-2002.  
In order to estimate the financial wealth for the period 1982-1988, we 
proceeded in the following way. The GDP shares of deposits and currency 
holdings,  insurance  contract  net  of  pensions,  other  fixed  claim  assets  and 
debts were rather stable for the first years for which data exist (1989-1992); 
consequently we fixed the ratios for 1982-1988 at the 1989 level. On the other 
hand, the stock and investment funds GDP share has displayed an increasing 
tendency during the decade of 1990, in parallel with the Madrid stock market 
index.  Therefore, for 1986-1988, we applied the 1989 stock and investment 
funds/GDP ratio corrected by the evolution of the stock market index during 
the 4th quarter (highest minus lowest values). For 1982-1985 the share was 
set at the same level of 1986. 
 
Real Estate Wealth: The consistency between valuation rules in the tax code 
and the data available posed several methodological problems to estimate 
this fraction of wealth. Between 1978 and 1992, urban real estate was mainly 
priced at cadastral values. Rural estate valuation formula required capitalizing 
at 4% the amount fixed in the local estate tax. Since 1992, real estate, both 
urban and rural, must be valued at the highest of (a) the property registry 
value, (b) the purchasing price, (c) the value determined for other local taxes. 
Local real estate taxes are based on cadastral values, computed following an 
established  formula  with  price-coefficients  defined  for  land  surface, 
construction type, urban zone, etc, and which can be updated periodically by 
local authorities. Nevertheless, cadastral values are generally less than 50% 
of market prices. This can be easily verified comparing the Bank of Spain 
statistics  (based  on  market  prices,  source  (c))  with  the  property  registry 
statistics (source (d)). For instance, between 1990 and 2002 the ratio between 
both series ranged from 30% to 45%. This implies a gap difficult to correct 
between the numerator and the denominator. For this reason, we also studied 
separately the distribution of financial wealth (net of real estate) in the main 
text. 
Real estate net wealth is the result of deducting mortgage loans from 
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Indicadores del Mercado de la Vivienda (source (c)). Data correspond to the 
4th quarter and cover years 1987 to 2004. These estimates are constructed 
upon  the  series  of  residential  units,  average  surface  and  average  market 
prices.  On  the  liability  side,  mortgage  debts  are  approximated  by  long  run 
debts from Cuentas Financieras de la Economía Española (source (a)). For 
the years 1982-1986 we fixed the real estate wealth/GDP ratio at the 1987 
level. 
Wealth tax information excludes Navarra and Pais Vasco. To take this 
fact into account, we corrected total wealth as follows.  We assumed that total 
wealth in those regions was roughly proportional to real estate wealth.  The 
share of Navarra and Pais Vasco real estate wealth in Spain is taken from 
Caixa de Catalunya (2004) (source (e)), based on Ministerio de Fomento. 
The numerator, that is, the real estate declared in the wealth tax files, 
was also adjusted to reflect market prices. The correction factor is the ratio 
between  the market-priced  wealth (source  (c))  and  the  GDP  from 1987  to 
2002. Between 1982 and 1986 the factor was set to the 1987 value. This 
decision was based on the fact that the ratio [real estate wealth from source 
(c)/ real estate wealth from property registry statistics source (d)] displays a 
very similar pattern but is available for a shorter period. 
 
C.2 Total number of individuals 
 
For  the  period  1933-1971,  total  number  of  individuals  is  computed  as  the 
number  of  individuals  in  the  Spanish  population  aged  20  and  above;  this 
excludes Navarra and Alava since 1937 and 1943 respectively. These series 
are based on Census interpolations provided by INE and reported in Table 
B3, column 1. Column 2 also indicates the total number of tax returns (with 
positive  taxable  income)  actually  filed  as  well  as  the  fraction  of  adult 
population filling a tax return (Column 3). 
For the period 1982-2002, total individuals correspond to the number of 
adults aged 20 and over excluding País Vasco and Navarra. Again this series 
come from Census interpolations and are reported in Table A1, Column 1. 
The census data have been taken from Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, 
Dirección General del Instituto Geográfico Catastral, Censo de la Población 
de  España  1930;  Ministerio  de  Trabajo,  Dirección  General  de  Estadística, 
Censo de la Población de España 1940; Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística, Censo de la Población de España 1950; Censo de la 
Población y las Viviendas de España 1960; Censo de la Población de España 
1970;  Instituto  Nacional  de  Estadística,  Censo  de  Población  y  Viviendas 
1980, 1991, 2001. 
 
C.3 Total Income Denominator  
 
For the period 1981-2002 total income is defined as wages and salaries from 
National Accounts net of social contributions plus 50% of social transfers, plus 
66.6%  of  unincorporated  business  income  (excluding  Navarra  and  Pais 
Vasco), plus all non-business, non labor income reported on tax returns.  The 
total denominator series expressed in 2000 Euros is reported in Column 4 of 
Table A1. The average income per adult is reported in Column 7 while the 
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For the period 1933-1971, we use as denominator 66% of the Spanish 
GDP from Prados de la Escosura (2003). The number 66% is chosen to be 
consistent  with  our  denominator  for  the  recent  period,  which  fluctuates 
between 63% and 69% of Spanish GDP (excluding Pais Vasco and Navarra). 
Our denominator for the 1933-1971 period is reported in Table B3. The first 
official  consumer  price  index  dates  back  to  1940.  Table  B3,  Column  4 
displays the income series converted in 2000 Euros. 
 
 
D. Estimating Top Shares 
 
D.1. Basic Pareto Interpolation 
 
The  general  interpolation  technique  is  based  on  the  well  known  empirical 
regularity  that  the  top  tail  of  the  income  distribution  is  very  closely 
approximated by a Pareto distribution. A Pareto distribution has a cumulative 
distribution function of the form F(y)=1-(k/y)
a where k and a are constants, 
and a is the Pareto parameter of the distribution. Such a distribution has the 
key property that the average income above a given threshold y is always 
exactly proportional to y. The coefficient of proportionality is equal to b=a/(a-
1). 
The  first  step  consists  then  in  estimating  the  income  thresholds 
corresponding  to  each  of  the  percentiles  P90,  P95,  P99,  …,  P99.99,  that 
define  our  top  income  groups.  For  each  percentile  p,  we  look  first  for  the 
published income bracket [s,t] containing the percentile p. We estimate then 
the parameters a and k of the Pareto distribution by solving the two equations:  
k=s p
(1/a) and k=t q
(1/a) where p is the fraction of tax returns above s and q the 
fraction of tax returns above t.
48 Note that the Pareto parameters k and a may 
vary  from  bracket  to  bracket.  Once  the  density  distribution  on  [s,t]  is 
estimated,  it  is  straightforward  to  estimate  the  income  threshold,  say  yp, 
corresponding to percentile p. 
  The  second  step  consists  of  estimating  the  amounts  of  income 
reported  above  income  threshold  yp.  We  estimate  the  amount  reported 
between  income  yp  and  t  (the  upper  bound  of  the  published  bracket  [s,t] 
containing yp) using the estimated Pareto density with parameters a and k. 
We then add to that amount the amounts in all the published brackets above t.  
  Once  the  total  amount  above  yp  is  obtained,  we  obtain  directly  the 
mean income above percentile p by dividing the amount by the number of 
individuals  above  percentile  p.  Finally,  the  share  of  income  accruing  to 
individuals above percentile p is obtained by dividing the total amount above 
yp by our income denominator series (Table A1, col. (4)). Average incomes 
and  income  shares  for  intermediate  fractiles  (P90-95,  P95-99,  etc.)  are 
obtained by subtraction. 
 
D.2. Adjustments to raw Pareto Interpolations 
 
Period 1933-1971 
                                                 
48 This is the standard method of Pareto interpolation used by Kuznets (1953) and Feenberg 
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For the period 1933-1971 we adopt the following adjustments to the statistics.  
In  1935  and  1940,  the  statistics  also  report  tax  filers  from  previous 
years,  who  have  been  subject  to  an  audit  and  a  subsequent  increase  in 
reported income. Those audited tax filers are placed in the bracket where they 
belonged in the previous year but only the additional income uncovered by 
the audit is reported. As a result of those audited tax filers, the number of 
filers  in  each  bracket  is  too  high  relative  to  income  reported.  In  order  to 
remove those audit taxpayers, we discard the information on the number of 
tax  filers  per  bracket  and  we  use  only  the  total  income  per  bracket.  We 
recover the number of tax filers by assuming that average income per current 
year taxpayer in 1935 and 1940 is the same as in 1934. Our estimates are 
slightly over-estimated due to the additional income due to audits. However, 
additional income due to audits is probably small relative to regular reported 
income.  Furthermore,  income  including  audits  is  a  closer  approximation  to 
real  incomes  than  income  before  audits  (although  for  1935  and  1940,  the 
additional income from audits corresponds to an earlier year). 
  For 1941, about 14% of tax returns were reported separately and only 
in the aggregate. As the average income for those 14% returns is extremely 
close to the average for remaining returns, we assume that those 14% returns 
are distributed by brackets in the same way as the rest of returns. The same 
issue arises for 1957, 1958, 1961 where a significant fraction of returns were 
not  processed  in  time  for  the  regular  publication  and  are  only  reported  in 
aggregate in the subsequent publication year. In each case, we assume that 
those late returns are distributed as the regular returns. Because the average 
income of late returns is close to the average for regular returns, this seems 
an acceptable assumption. 
  From 1942, a deduction for dependent children was introduced and the 
tax returns are presented by size of income net of this dependent children 
exemption. The deduction is 3,000 Pesetas for each child from 1942 to 1953, 
10,000 Pesetas from 1954 to 1960, and 25,000 Pesetas in 1961. We add 
back those deductions to our income estimates in order to estimates shares 
based on income before those deductions. In most years, those deductions 
are  reported  by  brackets.  When  they  are  only  reported  in  aggregate,  we 
impute the deductions in each bracket using years when this information is 
provided. The average number of children is fairly stable overtime and across 
brackets so this approximation is acceptable. 
  Two important additional deductions are introduced in 1954. The first 
deduction  is  deductions  for  extraordinary  expenses  and  charitable 
contributions. The law allowed for deductible expenses without bounds, which 
were  declared  at  the  discretion  of  the  taxpayers:  wedding  expenses, 
pharmacy purchases, transfers to family members in state of necessity (where 
the term necessity was fuzzily defined). Individuals could also make donations 
without limits (many of which were suspected of being de facto self-donations 
for high income earners, when the individual himself managed the foundation, 
created with the sole purpose of attracting donations). The second deduction 
is a deduction for employment income equal to 33% of labor income up to a 
maximum deduction of 100,000 Pesetas. Those two deductions are reported 
by brackets for years 1958, 1959, and 1961, and are about 5% of reported 
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the same as in 1958 in years 1954-1957 when the information on deductions 
is not reported separately. 
  The 1971 tax statistics are reported by size of gross income equal to 
the sum of each component (capital income, business income, labor income, 
etc.) before the extraordinary deductions and the deductions for dependent 
children. However, the deduction for labor income has been netted out of the 
labor income component. Because there is no information of labor income by 
brackets, we assume that the fraction of labor income within the top 0.1% is 
20% (which was the corresponding number in 1961, the closest year where 
this information is available). The labor income deduction is also about 5% of 




1. Exclusions from the income tax 
 
Statistics  are  presented  by  brackets  of  income  net  of  the  labor  income 
deduction  and  the  pension  deduction.  The  amount  of  those  deductions  is 
reported for each bracket in the tax statistics. Therefore, for each fractile, we 
compute the average amount of deductions and add those amounts to the 
raw estimates. 
 
2. Series excluding capital gains 
 
Second,  since  1981,  capital  gains  are  included  in  taxable  income  (see 
appendix section B above). For series excluding capital gains, we need to 
subtract  the  capital  gains  component  from  the  raw  series.  The  amount  of 
capital  gains  is  also  reported  by  brackets  in  the  tax  statistics.  In  order  to 
compute our series from the raw series, one could simply deduct for each 
group  the  share  of  capital  gains  estimated  from  composition  tables.  The 
problem is that ranking according to the income including capital gains and 
ranking  according  to  income  excluding  capital  gains  might  be  different, 
especially at the very top. For example, in the extreme case where very top 
incomes of the income tax statistics distributions consist only of capital gains, 
then the deduction of capital gains would lead to the conclusion that the very 
top incomes of the income (excluding capital gains) distribution are equal to 
zero. Therefore, deducting the full amount of capital gains would provide an 
underestimate of the income shares we would like to estimate. In order to 
correct for this re-ranking bias, we therefore need to subtract less than 100% 
of capital gains.  
Based on other studies such as Piketty and Saez (2003) for the United 
States  and  Saez  and  Veall  (2005)  for  Canada,  where  not  only  similar 
tabulated  tax  statistics  but  also  micro  data  are  available,  a  good 
approximation is to subtract 80% of capital gains amounts instead of 100% to 
obtain shares of income excluding capital gains. This is therefore the rule we 
follow in the case of Spain. Using the 2002 large sample of micro-tax returns, 
we have verified that this rule gives very accurate results: the estimates based 
on  micro-data  excluding  capital  gains  for  2002  are  extremely  close  to  the 
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3. Shift from family to individual taxation in 1988 
 
Before 1988, taxation was based on the family unit (as in the United States 
today). Starting in 1989, individual taxation became possible and is actually 
an advantageous option when the secondary earner has positive income. As 
we  have  discussed  above,  our  top groups are  defined  relative  to the  total 
adult population and our series measure individual income concentration. For 
the period 1988 to 2002, income tax statistics measure individual incomes as 
married couples where both spouses have positive incomes have an incentive 
to file separately in order to reduce their tax burden.  
Before 1988, however, income tax statistics measure family income as 
the income of spouses are aggregated for income tax purposes. Therefore, 
our basic methodology overstates income concentration  (as spousal income 
is added to the income of top earners). Indeed, uncorrected series display a 
clearly visible discontinuity from 1987 to 1988. We use the micro tax panel 
data to make the correction for the 1981-1987 period. Using the micro data for 
1988, we can compute top income shares at the household level and at the 
individual level (as the micro data allows to reconstitute families). We can then 
compute  adjustment  factors  as  the  ratio  of  the  individual  shares  to  the 
household shares. We then apply those factors to all years from 1981 to 1987 
to obtain corrected estimates. This correction reduces raw income shares by 
about 10%. 
 
Top Wealth Shares Estimation 
 
Top  wealth  shares  for  the  period  1982-2002  are  also  estimated  using  the 
same  Pareto  interpolation  technique.  We  do  not  make  a  correction  for 
individual  versus  family  filing  because  the  wealth  tax  has  always  been 
assessed at the individual level (except for married couples with joint tenancy) 
and, in contrast to income share series, there are no discontinuity in the series 
from 1987 to 1988. 
  As in the case of the income tax, we add back exempted items such as 
exempted businesses (after the 1994 reform) or the standard exemption for 
the  main  residence  (after  2000),  which  are  fortunately  reported  by  wealth 
brackets in the published statistics. 
  We estimate two top wealth shares series : series excluding real estate 
and  series  included  market  priced  real  estate.  For  series  excluding  real 
estates, we subtract the real estate (including the real estate exemption after 
2000) from our raw estimates. For series including real estates, we inflate the 
value of real estate by a uniform multiplicative factor equal to total real estate 
from the Flow of Funds accounts divided by total cadastral value reported in 
aggregate  real  estate  statistics,  and  we  add  back  to  our  raw  series  the 
difference between the market price series and the cadastral value. 
 
Estimation of wealth and income composition series 
 
We have constructed income and wealth composition series for each of our 
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breakdown  of  income  and  wealth  into  various  components  by  income  and 
wealth brackets.  
The income composition series reported in Table C indicate for each 
upper income group the fraction of total income (including capital gains) that 
comes  from  the  various  types  of  income. We  consider  4  types  of  income: 
wage  income;  entrepreneurial  income;  capital  income  (excluding  capital 
gains); and realized capital gains. Wage income includes wages and salaries 
(including the wage income deduction), as well as pensions. Entrepreneurial 
income includes self-employment income from professions such as doctors, 
lawyers, etc. Business income also includes income from sole proprietorships, 
partnership  income,  and  farm  income.  Capital  income  includes  dividends, 
interest  income,  rents,  and  other  investment  income.  Capital  gains  include 
both long-term and short-term capital gains reported on tax returns. We have 
excluded  from  these  composition  series  the  other  income  category  which 
never make more than 5% of the total income as this simplifies the reading of 
our  composition  series  (the  other  income  category  was  taken  into  account 
when computing top income levels and top income shares in total income).  
The wealth composition series reported in Table E2 indicate for each 
upper wealth group the fraction of total wealth (including the market value of 
real  estate)  that  comes  from  the  various  types  of  assets.  We  consider  six 
types of assets: real estate, business assets, fixed claim assets, stocks, other 
assets, and debts. Real estate includes the market value of real estate. It is 
estimated as reported real estate amount (including the deduction for primary 
residence since 2000) times the ratio of total market value of real estate in 
Spain divided by total cadastral value of real estate in Spain. Business assets 
include  the  value  of  unincorporated  business  assets.  Fixed  claim  assets 
include  cash,  checking  and  savings  accounts,  annualized  wealth,  life 
insurance,  public  and  corporate  bonds.  Stocks  include  publicly  traded  and 
closely  held  corporate  stock  either  directly  owned  or  owned  through 
investment  funds.  Other  includes  household  goods,  jewels,  vehicles, 
intellectual  property  rights,  non-exempted  works  of  arts  and  other  assets. 
Debts include mortgage debts, consumer debts, and business debts. 
The  composition  series  are  estimated  from  the  published  tables  in 
indicating  for  each  income  (or  wealth)  bracket  not  only  the  number  of 
taxpayers and the total amount of their total income (or wealth) but also the 
separate  amounts  for  each  type  of  income  (or  wealth),  as  well  as  the 
deductions. The  composition  of  income  (or wealth)  within  each  group  was 
estimated from these tables using a simple linear interpolation method. Such 
a method is less satisfactory than the Pareto interpolation method used to 
estimate top income levels (no obvious law seems to fit composition patterns 
in a stable way). See Piketty and Saez (2007) for a more precise discussion 
of this method where it is systematically compared with direct estimates using 
micro data. 
 
D.3. Estimating Top Shares from individual Income Tax Panel 
 
We also computed top shares with and without capital gains (Tables B5 and 
B6)  using  the  microdata  from  the  panel  of  income  tax  returns  1982-1998 
(Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Panel IRPF-AEAT) and the 2002 sample of 
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IRPF 2002). The panel is composed of approximately 2% of total returns (the 
number of observations ranges from 123,599 in 1982 to 308,558 in 1998), 
while the 2002 sample has information for 907,399 out of 15,481,382 files and 
oversamples  high  incomes.  The  definition  of  individual  income  follows  the 
same  rules  as  in  the  tabulated  data  case.  Total  reference  income  and 
population is also the same. 
As it was described above, before 1988 data available only identifies 
family income as the income of spouses is aggregated in the tax file due to 
mandatory joint filing.  We used the micro tax panel for 1988 to adjust for this. 
For 2002, the results from the sample are very close to the results from 
the tax tabulations. The 2002 sample perfectly matches aggregates. On the 
other side, the panel shares display an overall similar pattern when compared 
to shares based on grouped data, but differences are somewhat larger. This 




E. Computing Marginal Tax Rates 
 
Marginal tax rates displayed in Table B4 were computed using the panel of 
individual income tax returns 1982-1998 and the 2002 sample of income tax 
files. For each individual we computed the taxable income following the tax 
code, as the sum of taxable sources excluding elements taxed by average or 
flat rates and not subject to the progressive tax scale (capital gains, irregular 
income and income adjustments from previous years). Then we applied the 
tax scale to identify the marginal rate that affects each individual. 
We also computed total gross income as the sum of taxable sources, 
capital gains and irregular income (but excluding adjustments from previous 
years) plus labor income deductions. We ranked individuals by gross income 
(as  done  for  our  estimates  based  on  grouped  data)  and  computed  the 
average marginal tax rates for top percentiles weighted by gross income. This 
procedure explains the fact that in some cases the marginal tax rate is lower 
for the top 0.01% than for the top 0.1%. The reason is the following: consider 
two individuals in the top 0.01%; the first one has no capital gains and no 
irregular income; consequently she is affected by the maximum marginal rate; 
the second individual only has capital gains; therefore she is affected by a 
zero  marginal  rate  according  to  the  progressive  tax  scale,  while  she  still 
belongs to the top group. As the proportion of capital gains in total income 
increases with income (see Table C), it is then possible to find more people at 
the top subject to relatively smaller marginal rates.  
 
F.  Estimating  Net  Worth  Shares  and  Composition  from  the  Wealth 
Survey 
 
In  2002  the  Bank  of  Spain  conducted  a  household  wealth  survey  whose 
preliminary results are presented in Bover (2004). We compare our results 
based on the tax statistics with the survey microdata (Table E3).  
To be consistent with our tax estimates we defined net financial wealth 
as the sum of: checking accounts, bank deposits, jewelry, antiques, artworks, 








































1  44 
other household claims net of debts different from mortgage debts. Total net 
wealth is net financial wealth as described plus the declared price for the main 
residence plus other real estate minus mortgage debts. We do not consider 
pension funds, which are not taxed. 
As  the  survey  data  are  based  on  household  information  while  our 
results refer to the individual distribution, we compute the top shares under 
two extreme scenarios. In the first one, we assume that all wealth belongs to 
the head of the household (panels C and D in Table E3). For the second 
scenario, we assume that every spouse owns 50% of the household wealth 
(panels E and F in Table E3). The reference total for the population is the 
number of adults aged 20 and over in all Spain, this time including País Vasco 
and Navarra.  
 
G. Previous Work on Inequality in Spain 
 
Until  the  beginning  of  the  decade  of  1970  the  studies  on  inequality  and 
income distribution in Spain are very scarce, due mainly to the lack of data. 
The Instituto de Estudios Agrosociales, 1958 ran a study on the distribution of 
expenditure  in  1956,  as  an  assignment  for  the  FAO,  while  the  Spanish 
statistics bureau (INE) conducted a households’ consumption survey in 1958 
(Infomación Comercial Española, 1962). 
The  first  households’  budget  surveys  (Encuesta  de  Presupuestos 
Familiares,  EPF)  were  carried  out  in  1964/1965,  1966/1967,  1969/1970, 
1973/1974 and 1980/1981. The results were somewhat deficient, and many 
ad-hoc assumptions were made for consistency with the national accounts, 
including corrections for under-reporting by income size and income source, 
as well as adjustments to a Pareto distribution. In fact, the ability of these 
surveys  to  approximate  a  comparable  total personal  income  from  National 
Accounts was extremely limited.
49 They generated the first distribution series 
to be comparable in time (Alcaide Inchausti 1967, 1974; Alcaide and Alcaide 
1974, 1977, 1983). According to their estimates, the top 10% received 36.8%, 
41.3%,  40.7%,  39.5%  and  29.2%  of  income  respectively,  stressing  a 
decrease in inequality levels from 1973/1974 to 1980/1981.
50 
In 1963 the INE launched the publication Salarios, based on an annual 
employer survey, referred to workers legally related to any firm employing at 
least  10  individuals.  The  survey  covered  most  of  the  industrial  sector, 
construction  and  some  services,  but  excluded  the  agricultural  sector,  non-
road transportation, leisure and civil service. Respondents were about 2,400 
establishments  that  reported  on  the  number  of  workers  and  their  average 
salary by wage intervals. The survey had important methodological revisions 
in  1976  and  1981.  Albi,  1975  computed  Gini  coefficients  from  this  wage 
survey  between  1963  and  1972,  finding  an  increasing  trend  in  earnings 
                                                 
49  The  differences  between  National  Accounts  and  household  surveys  regarding  income 
measurement  have  been  analyzed  in  Deaton,  2005  and  the  Canberra  Expert  Group  on 
Household Income Statistics (2001). 
50 As an example, the magnitude of the corrections applied by these studies can be seen from 
the  fact  that,  according  to  the  1980/1981  survey,  the  top  10%  received  25.4%  of  income 
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inequality; Cordero et al., 1988 compared the 1982 and 1986 wage surveys 
and also found a growing level of wage concentration.
51 
Between  1964  and  1980,  the  INE  published  an  annual  report  on 
national income and distribution (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1965-1970 
and 1971-1980), but the information was extremely limited and focused not on 
the  personal  but  on  the  functional  distribution  of  aggregate  income  from 
National Accounts; it also included a summary of the main results from the 
wage survey mentioned above. 
Based  on  the  1980/1981  households’  budget  survey,  Ruiz-Castillo 
(1987)  studied  inequality  using  the  information  about  expenditure  and  not 
income. Bosch et al., 1989 applied the same methodology to compare the 
1973/1974  and  1980/1981  surveys.  A  new  comparison  between  the 
1973/1974  and  1980/1981  surveys  pertains  to  Ruiz-Castillo,  1998.  Ruiz-
Castillo and Sastre, 1999 added the comparison with the 1990/1991 survey. 
The authors find a considerable drop in inequality between 1973/1974 and 
1980/1981; given the increase of per capita expenditure, they conclude that a 
rise in welfare took place. For the decade of 1980 they observe an increase in 
the average expenditure but a stop in the pattern of reduction in inequality 
which  took  place  during  the  previous  decade.  These  studies  have  been 
extended in Del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo, 2001a,b. Gradín, 2000, 2002 has used 
the EPFs to analyze polarization and inequality from 1973 to 1991.
52 
Notwithstanding the different levels reported in inequality indexes and 
the different variable analyzed (income, expenditure), the studies based on 
households’ surveys show a decrease in inequality during the 1970s.  
Research  has  also  been  done  on  the  basis  of  the  European 
Community  Household  Panel  (ECHP).  See,  for  example,  Pascual  and 
Sarabia, 2004 for an analysis of the period 1993-2000 (they find a drop in 
inequality  in  1993-1994,  a  sustained  increase  in  1994-1996,  and  a  new 
decrease  in  1997-2000;  overall  inequality  measured  by  the  Gini  coefficient 
seems to display a small overall reduction), and Ayala and Sastre, 2005 for 
mobility  issues  between  1994  and  1998.  Budría  and  Díaz-Giménez,  2006 
analyze in detail the 1998 ECHP wave, as well as income mobility between 
1994 and 1998. 
Starting in 1985, the INE developed a continuous households’ survey. 
Oliver et al., 2001 has used this source between 1985-1996 and documents 
an  improvement  in  income  distribution  for  the  whole  period  according  to 
several  indicators;  nevertheless,  the  reported  Gini  coefficient  for  1996  is 
statistically equal to that of 1987.  
More  recently,  researchers  have  used  income  tax  data  to  assess 
inequality,  providing  a  different  picture  when  compared  to  results  from 
households’ surveys. Castañer, 1991 and Lasheras et al., 1993 analyze the 
redistributive  power  of  the  income  tax;  the  authors  show  that  several 
inequality  indicators  grew  steadily  between  1982  and  1990.  Ayala  and 
Onrubia, 2001 use the income tax panel between 1982 and 1994 and income 
tax tabulations between 1995 and 1998 to compute Gini indexes. They do not 
consider capital gains. They observe an increasing inequality trend between 
1982  and  1991,  followed  by  a  relative  stability  until  1994,  and  a  new 
                                                 
51 See Cordero et al., 1988 for an account of the limitations of the wage survey since 1981. 









































1  46 
increasing trend after 1995, which the authors attribute to a growing inequality 
in the wage distribution. Rodríguez and Salas, 2006 use the income tax panel 
to analyze the redistributive consequences of the income tax reforms between 
1982 and 1995. 
Finally,  both  survey  and  tax  sources  have  been  used  to  study  tax 
reforms,  as  in  Díaz  and  Sebastián,  2004  and  González-Torrabadella  and 
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Number of adults 
(aged 20+)
Average 
income in each 
group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Adult 
Population 30,718,000 14,653 €
Top 10%  31,599 € Top 10-5% 1,535,900 35,993 €
Top 5% 42,163 € Top 5-1% 1,228,720 55,411 €
Top 1% 83,081 € Top 1-0.5% 153,590 95,132 €
Top .5% 112,559 € Top 0.5-0.1% 122,872 154,655 €
Top .1% 255,964 € Top 0.1-0.01% 27,646 426,328 €
Top .01% 989,652 € Top 0.01% 3,072 2,150,855 €
Notes: Computations based on income tax return statistics and National Accounts. 
Income defined as annual gross income reported on tax returns including capital gains 
and before individual income taxes but net of all social contributions (employer and employee)
Amounts are expressed in current 2004 Euros. 
Column (2) reports the income thresholds corresponding to each of the percentiles in column (1). For example,
an annual income of at least 31,599 Euros is required to belong to the top 10% tax units, etc.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average Real Income and Consumer Price Index in Spain, 1930-2004
Source: Table A1.
Figure reports the average real income per adult (aged 20 and above), expressed in real 2004 Euros.




























































































































































































The Top 0.01% Income Share in Spain, 1933-2004
Source: 1933-1971 from Table B3 (column top 0.01%), 1981-2004 from Table B2 (column top 0.01%).
For 1933 to 1971, estimations based on the old income tax statistics.
For 1981 to 2004, estimations based on income excluding realized capital gains (for homogeneity
































































































































































The Top 0.01% Income Share in Spain, US and France, 1933-2004
Sources: US: Piketty and Saez (2003); France: Piketty (2001) and Landais (2007);
Spain: 1933-1971 from Table B3 (column top 0.01%), 1981-2004 from Table B2 (column top 0.01%).







































































































































































The Top 10-5%, Top 5-1%, and Top 1% Income Share in Spain, 1981-2004
Source: Table B1, columns top 10-5%, top 5-1%, and top 1%.

































































































































































The Top 1-0.5%, Top 0.5-0.1%, and Top 0.1% Income Share in Spain, 1981-2004
Source: Table B1, columns top 1-0.5%, top 0.5-0.1%, and top 0.1%.































































































































































The Top 0.1% Income Share and Composition in Spain, 1981-2004
Source: Table B1, top 0.1% income share and Table C, composition columns for top 0.1%.
The figure displays the income share of the top 0.1% tax units, and how the top 0.1% incomes are  
divided into four income components: wages and salaries (including pensions), 
business and professional income, capital income (interest, dividends, and rents), and realized capital gains.
For example, in 1981, the top 0.1% was 1.95% of total income. Of those 1.95%, 0.55% were
























































































































































































Madrid Stock-Market Index and Capital Gains at the Top, 1981-2004
Source: Madrid Stock Market Index from Globalfinance data.
For each year, the mean of the low and high is reported.
Capital gains at the top 1% is the real amount of capital gains reported by the top 1% income earners
The vertical axis measures the logarithm of the Madrid Stock Market Index and the logarithm of























































































































































Top Wage Income Shares in Spain, 1982-2002









































































































Average Net Worth and Composition, 1982-2004
Source: Table A2.
Net real estate is defined as total household real estate wealth net of mortgage debt
Fixed claim assets are cash, deposits, and bonds.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Top 1% Wealth Share in Spain, 1982-2004






















































































































































































































































































































The Top 0.1% wealth Share and Composition in Spain, 1982-2004
Source: Table E1 and E2, columns top 0.1%.
The figure displays the wealth share of the top 1% tax units, and how the top 1% wealth holdings are  
divided into 4 components: real estate, business assets, fixed claim assets (cash, deposits, bonds),















































































































































The Top 0.01% Financial Wealth Share and Composition in Spain, 1982-2002
Source: Table E1 and E2, and direct computations based on wealth tax statistics.
The figure displays the financial wealth share and composition of the top 0.01% tax units.
Stocks are broken down into three components: publicly traded stocks, taxable closely held stocks,




























































































Closely held stock (non taxable)







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Top 1% Top .5% Top .1% Top .01% Top 1-.5% Top .5-.1% Top .1-.01% Top .01%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Top Wealth Shares Including Real Estate
1982 19.81 15.50 7.83 2.58 4.31 7.66 5.25 2.58
1983 19.41 15.08 7.74 2.68 4.33 7.35 5.05 2.68
1984 18.85 14.61 7.40 2.46 4.24 7.20 4.94 2.46
1985 19.11 14.64 7.27 2.37 4.46 7.37 4.90 2.37
1986 19.52 14.92 7.43 2.55 4.60 7.49 4.88 2.55
1987 19.04 14.44 7.03 2.31 4.60 7.41 4.72 2.31
1988 17.28 12.98 6.36 2.04 4.30 6.62 4.32 2.04
1989 16.88 12.62 6.04 1.92 4.26 6.58 4.11 1.92
1990 16.82 12.38 5.79 1.78 4.44 6.60 4.01 1.78
1991 16.12 11.73 5.39 1.59 4.39 6.34 3.79 1.59
1992 16.02 11.63 5.32 1.60 4.39 6.32 3.72 1.60
1993 16.62 11.84 5.46 1.66 4.78 6.38 3.80 1.66
1994 16.33 11.50 5.18 1.53 4.83 6.32 3.66 1.53
1995 15.93 11.20 5.00 1.47 4.73 6.20 3.52 1.47
1996 16.62 11.75 5.25 1.56 4.88 6.50 3.69 1.56
1997 17.39 12.17 5.39 1.59 5.23 6.78 3.81 1.59
1998 17.22 12.03 5.36 1.61 5.19 6.67 3.74 1.61
1999 17.17 12.26 5.31 1.58 4.92 6.95 3.73 1.58
2000 17.30 12.42 5.39 1.58 4.88 7.03 3.81 1.58
2001 17.16 12.28 5.32 1.60 4.88 6.95 3.72 1.60
2002 18.27 13.10 5.60 1.57 5.18 7.49 4.03 1.57
2003 17.59 12.38 5.17 1.44 5.21 7.22 3.73 1.44
2004 17.61 12.37 5.17 1.44 5.24 7.21 3.73 1.44
B. Top Financial Wealth Shares (excluding real estate)
1982 24.85 21.36 13.16 5.46 3.49 8.20 7.70 5.46
1983 25.22 21.36 13.34 5.99 3.87 8.02 7.35 5.99
1984 23.40 19.72 12.20 5.32 3.68 7.51 6.89 5.32
1985 23.73 19.75 11.97 5.09 3.98 7.78 6.88 5.09
1986 25.41 21.06 12.82 5.61 4.35 8.24 7.21 5.61
1987 24.77 20.47 12.48 5.32 4.30 7.99 7.16 5.32
1988 24.68 20.06 11.64 4.93 4.62 8.43 6.71 4.93
1989 24.76 20.24 11.66 5.01 4.52 8.58 6.64 5.01
1990 25.78 20.92 11.77 4.91 4.86 9.15 6.85 4.91
1991 24.74 19.98 11.09 4.54 4.76 8.89 6.55 4.54
1992 23.35 18.72 10.19 4.15 4.64 8.53 6.04 4.15
1993 23.25 18.18 9.97 4.05 5.07 8.21 5.92 4.05
1994 22.08 17.03 9.02 3.52 5.06 8.01 5.50 3.52
1995 20.77 15.85 8.37 3.25 4.92 7.48 5.12 3.25
1996 21.28 16.16 8.59 3.32 5.12 7.57 5.28 3.32
1997 21.94 16.32 8.63 3.20 5.62 7.69 5.42 3.20
1998 21.17 15.64 8.39 3.15 5.53 7.25 5.24 3.15
1999 22.04 17.27 9.07 3.41 4.78 8.20 5.66 3.41
2000 24.34 19.06 10.02 3.74 5.28 9.03 6.29 3.74
2001 24.79 19.44 10.36 4.04 5.35 9.08 6.32 4.04
2002 26.19 20.58 10.90 4.13 5.61 9.68 6.77 4.13
2003 25.13 19.77 10.43 3.98 5.36 9.34 6.45 3.98
2004 25.61 20.21 10.76 4.22 5.40 9.44 6.55 4.22
Notes: Computations by authors on wealth tax return statistics. 
See details in Appendix.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Adults Total Net  Average  Total Net  Average  top shares Real Estate Fixed Claim  Stocks Business Other Debts
Financial Wealth Wealth Assets
(millions 2000 (2000 Euros) (millions 2000 (2000 Euros) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
('000s) Euros) Euros)
Total from tax stats. 30.249 811.933 26.842 3.022.332 99.915
Total from survey 32.339 387.417 11.980 1.977.929 61.163 88,07 6,60 5,39 8,52 0,96 -9,55
A. Including real estate. Individual distribution from tax returns
top 1% 302 552.180 1.825.449 18,27 61,48 8,52 28,25 1,31 2,17 -1,72
top 0.5% 151 395.774 2.616.777 13,10 57,79 7,90 32,37 1,26 2,43 -1,74
top 0.1% 30 169.311 5.597.244 5,60 47,74 7,18 42,87 1,07 2,99 -1,84
top 1-0.5% 156.406 5,18
top 0.5-0.1% 226.463 7,49
top 0.1% 169.311 5,60
B. Excluding real estate. Individual distribution from tax returns
top 1% 302 197.592 653.218 24,34
top 0.5% 151 154.722 1.022.989 19,06
top 0.1% 30 81.372 2.690.070 10,02
top 1-0.5% 42.870 5,28
top 0.5-0.1% 73.350 9,03
top 0.1% 81.372 10,02
C. Including real estate. Individual distribution from the survey assuming that all wealth belongs to the head of household
top 10% 3.234 324.673 100.398 1.252.960 387.450 63,35 78,06 6,03 7,67 11,96 1,14 -4,86
top 5% 1.617 278.134 172.013 902.939 558.428 45,65 72,93 5,65 9,80 14,69 1,42 -4,49
top 1% 323 176.129 544.639 401.837 1.242.592 20,32 58,55 4,76 16,80 20,62 2,22 -2,94
top 0.5% 162 144.511 893.734 292.866 1.811.243 14,81 52,70 4,59 20,29 22,33 2,62 -2,53
top 0.1% 32 90.772 2.806.910 137.602 4.255.030 6,96 35,19 3,40 30,65 31,18 1,02 -1,44
top 10-5% 46.540 350.020 17,70
top 5-1% 102.005 501.102 25,33
top 1-0.5% 31.618 108.971 5,51
top 0.5-0.1% 53.739 155.264 7,85
top 0.1% 90.772 137.602 6,96
D. Excluding real estate. Individual distribution from the survey assuming that all wealth belongs to the head of household
top 10% 3.234 369.197 114.166 95,30
top 5% 1.617 323.762 200.232 83,57
top 1% 323 208.686 645.316 53,87
top 0.5% 162 165.658 1.024.520 42,76
top 0.1% 32 102.122 3.157.898 26,36
top 10-5% 45.436 11,73
top 5-1% 115.075 29,70
top 1-0.5% 43.029 11,11
top 0.5-0.1% 63.536 16,40
top 0.1% 102.122 26,36
E. Including real estate. Individual distribution based on the survey assuming that wealth is divided equally between spouses
top 10% 3.234 292.241 90.369 1.006.744 311.313 50,90 74,88 5,96 8,91 13,66 1,39 -4,79
top 5% 1.617 244.438 151.174 716.443 443.088 36,22 69,26 5,70 11,33 16,19 1,55 -4,03
top 1% 323 151.786 469.365 328.579 1.016.058 16,61 56,70 4,52 18,15 21,23 2,74 -3,35
top 0.5% 162 130.652 808.025 234.869 1.452.558 11,87 46,75 4,29 22,99 25,65 3,12 -2,80
top 0.1% 32 80.162 2.478.835 109.222 3.377.463 5,52 27,86 3,04 32,87 36,65 1,11 -1,53
top 10-5% 47.803 290.301 14,68
top 5-1% 92.651 387.864 19,61
top 1-0.5% 21.134 93.710 4,74
top 0.5-0.1% 50.490 125.646 6,35
top 0.1% 80.162 109.222 5,52
F. Excluding real estate. Individual distribution based on the survey assuming that wealth is divided equally between spouses
top 10% 3.234 339.119 104.865 87,53
top 5% 1.617 288.455 178.396 74,46
top 1% 323 178.137 550.848 45,98
top 0.5% 162 143.099 885.002 36,94
top 0.1% 32 86.684 2.680.503 22,37
top 10-5% 50.664 13,08
top 5-1% 110.318 28,48
top 1-0.5% 35.038 9,04
top 0.5-0.1% 56.415 14,56
top 0.1% 86.684 22,37
Source: Computations based on tax returns and Bank of Spain, Encuesta Financiera de las Familias 2002.
Notes: The  number of total adults for the tax-based statistics (30,249 million) is smaller than the
number of total adults for the survey-based statistics (32,339 million) because the former excludes País Vasco and Navarra.
Wealth Composition Total Financial Wealth Total Wealth












































































































































































1# Tax returns # Tax returns # Inspected













1944 12,312 5,849 1,147
1945 11,817 6,629 1,140
1946 13,189 8,223 2,096
1947 17,897 7,983 1,964
1948 16,649 9,067 2,933
1949 19,755 10,111 3,294
1950 22,930 12,419 3,403
1951 23,887 13,597 3,524
1952 26,373 15,427 2,772
1953 27,653 16,545 1,118
1954 89,460 21,332 2,638
1955 98,604 26,716 1,915
1956 109,026 1,074
1957 119,618 38,493 1,306










1968 199,592 5,777 6,595
1969 228,132 13,709 8,979
1970 263,181 20,072 7,813




Sources: Income tax statistics published by the fiscal administration for years 1933 to 1971;
Gota Losada (1966); Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (1973); Martí Basterrechea (1974).








































1# Tax Returns # Inspected Files # Tax Returns # Inspected Files
('000s) ('000s) ('000s) ('000s)
1986 7,896 34.90 781
1987 8,028 33.75 887 9.34
1988 8,954 25.04 756 6.97
1989 9,845 16.45 855 5.40
1990 10,965 28.05 974 9.58
1991 11,584 21.31 1,033 7.04
1992 12,341 33.39 863 9.61
1993 12,794 31.93 928 7.46
1994 13,578 25.77 809 4.89
1995 14,119 21.28 783 3.26
1996 14,620 18.97 825 2.23
1997 15,000 15.34 892 1.73
1998 15,424 10.06 946 1.21
1999 13,797 10.90 981 1.14
2000 14,123 9.67 869 1.07
2001 14,734 8.34 874 0.99
2002 15,410 8.25 884 0.92
Source: Agencia Tributaria, Memoria de Actividades
Income Tax Wealth Tax
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1941 Top 0.03% 19.92 35.81 26.43 4.43 12.54 0.87
1942 Top 0.03% 19.58 38.89 15.63 5.32 18.77 1.81
1943 Top 0.03% 19.96 37.79 10.95 6.88 21.77 2.66
1944 Top 0.04% 19.37 38.34 12.66 6.69 20.13 2.80
1945 Top 0.04% 19.34 36.60 12.87 7.51 19.21 4.47
1946 Top 0.05% 16.90 34.52 11.74 13.35 17.62 5.86
1947 Top 0.05% 17.96 32.14 12.14 13.42 19.04 5.30
1948 Top 0.05% 19.29 32.74 9.22 14.18 19.14 5.43
1949 Top 0.06% 19.45 32.94 8.08 13.44 19.90 6.18
1950 Top 0.07% 18.11 28.25 9.27 20.14 18.75 5.48
1951 Top 0.07% 17.34 28.26 9.18 20.48 19.29 5.45
1952 Top 0.08% 17.19 28.43 10.05 21.35 18.30 4.68
1953 Top 0.09% 17.43 28.88 9.20 20.24 18.41 5.84
1958 Top 0.05% 11.48 32.89 11.31 19.04 22.50 2.79
1959 Top 0.05% 11.65 33.26 9.51 18.71 24.10 2.76
1961 Top 0.05% 13.05 30.09 8.38 25.99 17.00 5.50
1981 Top 0.05% 5.00 34.70 34.30 0.40 25.60
Source: official income tax statistics. For years 1941-1953, the composition statistics are only available in aggregate. 
As a result, the size of the corresponding top group varies across those years.
For 1958, 1959, 1961 and 1981, the composition data are available by brackets and are reported in the Table for the top 0.05%.
Table H. Composition of Top Incomes under Old Income Tax










































1Author Title Year (if applicable)
A. Income and Wealth Numerator
Dirección General de Rentas Públicas Estadística de la Contribución General sobre la Renta  1933-1934
Dirección General de Contribución sobre la Renta Estadística de la Contribución sobre la Renta  1935-1940, 1941, 1942
Dirección General de Contribución sobre la Renta Estadística de Servicios 1943, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 
1947, 1948, 1949, 1950
Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección General de la Estadística de Servicios 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955
Contribución sobre la Renta
Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección General de Estadística de Servicios de la Contribución sobre la Renta 1956, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1962
Impuestos sobre la Renta
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (1973) Informe sobre el Sistema Tributario Español
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Hacienda  Estadística
Pública Española 1974, (30), pp. 473-489
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Memoria de la Administración Tributaria 1982-1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987
Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
2000, 2001, 2002
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Memoria de la Administración Tributaria 2003, 2004, 2005
Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda y Presupuestos
Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria, Estadísticas IRPF y Patrimonio 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995
Departamento de Informática Tributaria 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000
Dirección General de Tributos, Subdirección General El Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas y  1999
de Política Tributaria el Impuesto sobre el Patrimonio en 1999
B. Income and Wealth Denominator
Instituto Nacional de Estadística Contabilidad Nacional de España Base 2000
Instituto Nacional de Estadística Contabilidad Nacional de España Base 1995
Instituto Nacional de Estadística Contabilidad Nacional de España Base 1986
Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, Dirección Censo de la Población de España 1930
General del Instituto Geográfico Catastral
Ministerio de Trabajo, Dirección General de Estadística Censo de la Población de España 1940
Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística Censo de la Población de España 1950
Censo de la Población y las Viviendas de España 1960
Censo de la Población de España 1970
Instituto Nacional de Estadística Censo de Población y Viviendas 1980, 1991, 2001
Prados de la Escosura, Leandro (2003) El Progreso Económico de España 1850-2000
Banco de España (2004) Cuentas Financieras de la Economía Española 1990-2005
Banco de España (2004), Boletín Económico 11 Encuesta Financiera de las Familias:
Descripción, Métodos y Resultados Preliminares
Banco de España Indicadores del Mercado de la Vivienda
http://www.bde.es/infoest/sindi.htm
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Dirección General Estadísticas Catastrales 1990-2003
de Catastro http://www.catastro.minhac.es/esp/estadisticas1.asp
Caixa de Catalunya (2004), Informe sobre el Consumo  Report Monográfico: El Crecimiento del Stock de Riqueza
y la Economía Familiar, Junio de las Familias Españolas y su Impacto sobre el
Consumo en el Período 1995-2003: Una Versión Territorial
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (1976) Datos Básicos para la Historia Financiera de España 1850-1975
C. Other
Comín, Francisco (1985), Monografía n.40,  Fuentes Cuantitativas para el Estudio del Sector Público 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales en España 1801-1980
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Panel IRPF-AEAT 1982-1998 1982-1998
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Muestra de Declarantes de IRPF 2002 2002
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Base de Datos del Sector Público Español
Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, Dirección General de Memoria de las  Actuaciones de la Inspección de los Tributos 1987
Inspección Financiera y Tributaria durante 1987
Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda, Dirección General de Memoria de las  Actuaciones de la Inspección de los Tributos 1988
Inspección Financiera y Tributaria
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Secretaria de Estado Resultados de la Inspección de los Tributos 1989
de Hacienda
Dirección General de Inpección Financiera y Tributaria Memoria de la Dirección General de Inpección Financiera 1990, 1991
y Tributaria
Agencia Tributaria, Departamento de Inspección FinancieraMemoria de Actividades 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997
y Tributaria 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Comisión para Evaluar el Fraude por el Impuesto
sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas
Ministerio de Hacienda Informe sobre Gestión Tributaria 1979-1981
Boletín Oficial del Estado
Gaceta de Madrid
Global Find Data http://www.globalfinddata.com
Table I. Data Sources
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